Driedger 's modern approach to statutory interpretation has substantially impacted the comprehension of ambiguous statutory language in Canadian courts for several decades. Although there are some drawbacks and flaws in this method, there is a myriad of merits that have positively shaped the interpretation of ambiguous statutory language over the years. When adjudicators are faced with the challenging task of analyzing unclear legislative text, they are obligated to utilizing Driedger 's modern approach to statutory interpretation. If it were not for this approach, the elucidation of equivocal legislative text in legal proceedings would have been entirely disparate and there presumably would have been more discrepancies, inconsistencies, and controversies over judges ' pivotal decisions made in Canadian courts. Driedger 's modern approach to statutory interpretation provides judges with discernment, guidance, and insight when making crucial decisions. Evidently, this strategy has facilitated decision making for judges and has considerably availed them during times where ambiguous statutory language has been a paramount impediment in judicial proceedings. One of the merits of Driedger 's modern approach to statutory interpretation includes the authorization of judges to explicate legislative text after analyzing the simple meaning of the text. Every individual should find the plain meaning of the legislative text to be identical as law is intended to be dependable and
Statutory interpretation is required where complication and ambiguity arises as to what the section actually provides and to whom is within the provisions. There are numerous occurrences where judges call for statues to be interpreted further in more depth; such as failure of legislation to cover a point, a broad term, drafting
It is often believed that the relationship between certainty and flexibility in judicial precedent has struck a fine line between being necessary and being precarious. The problem is that these two concepts of judicial precedent are seen as working against each other and not in tandem. There is proof, however, that as contrasting as they are on the surface they are actually working together to achieve one common goal.
Statutory interpretation is the legal process whereby a judge applies a statute to a case and must give meaning to the words in the statute in order to decide what they mean and how it should be applied to a particular case. When interpreting statutes, the judges’ role is to put into effect the Parliaments wishes. Conflicts may arise when deciding if the intention of Parliament can be found in the words of the statute itself or whether judges should acquire into the purpose of the Act then interpret the words themselves. In order to interpret these
Statutory purpose is a paramount tool in Breyer’s pragmatism. Indeed, it is one of the two tools (the second we will see later) that he has found to be “the most useful” (Yale 12) because it conduces one of pragmatism’s central values: sustaining the work of democracy. Ordinarily, the pragmatist turns to statutory purpose “when statutory language does not clearly answer the question of what the statute means or how it applies” (Breyer 85). However, the majority uses purpose in a slightly different way here. Rather than using it to modify its interpretation of the CSA, the majority uses statutory purpose to analogize it with the AAA: “Just as the [AAA] was designed ‘to control the volume
Although Callinan J in the Workchoices’ Case does not give full merit to these justifications, a textual approach to the interpretation of the constitution expressed in Engineers’ Case it not without its reasons. There are numerous considerations that need to be weighed when determining the appropriate methodology for constitutional interpretation. A major determining factor is the practicability of its legal application, and its ability to appropriately and fairly resolve issues entrenched in the text of the constitution. The following arguments provide a support for textualism, and a criticism of other methodologies.
In common law, judges interpret the law and judge apply it based on precedent from previous cases; compared to civil law which focuses on written legislature. In Canada, judges are given the chance to be activists. If a judge believes a citizen’s rights, under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, are being violated, they are given the power to rule against the unconstitutional law made by the elected branches of government; this concept is referred to as judicial activism (Hausegger, Hennigar, & Riddell, 2015, p. 123). Judicial activism ensures the individual rights of each person are upheld, but the concept is controversial. Judicial activism is problematic because it awards an authoritarian level of power to unelected judges, which goes against Canada’s democratic ideology where elected officials decide and vote on the laws (Cameron, 2009, p. 27). I argue that judicial activism should not be a part of Canada’s judicial process because it gives too much power to the courts and disrupts the democratic process of
In order to bring these often very abstract issues to life, we will examine a selection of high profile and prominent decisions (mainly from Canadian courts, and frequently from the Supreme Court of Canada) which can be said to have changed the law, and in which the judges of the court have disagreed among themselves. Cases to be covered concern controversial issues such as Battered Woman Syndrome, Euthanasia/ Physician Assisted Suicide, Hate Speech, Marijuana Use, Obscenity/ Pornography, Prostitution, or topics in human rights (i.e., freedom of expression, national security and the right not to be tortured, or religious freedom). Analysis of cases will include exploration and examination of the philosophical aspects of crucial terms and concepts that appear in Canadian law, such as in the Criminal Code of Canada, or in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
A judicial originalist “holds that judges should decide the cases before them solely through application of principles derived from the written text of the Constitution” and views that “any interpretation…should be based on the ‘original intent’ of the framers” (88). This contrasts with a judicial pragmatist, who
There are two different views on constitutional interpretation. The first view believes that it is best to keep the original written text and have a strict interpretation of the text in court cases. The opposing view believes it is
Statutory interpretation is process of interpreting statutes by the judges. The definition of statutes have had very specific words but indeed the judges would still need the statutory interpretation to help them. The reason of this, even how, the words in the statutes are specific but sometimes the words contains ambiguity and vagueness in words. On top of that, each word could give us different meaning. For example, we can find in the Oxford Dictionary where a word would contain at least one meaning. Hence, without the statutory interpretation, a lot of judges would have trouble in deciding their judgments in deciding a case. This essay will analyse the four rules, intrinsic aids and extrinsic aids and presumptions in the interpretation
1. When interpreting legislation, the Courts use several approaches to aid their interpretation. Describe how the literal, golden and mischief rules of interpretation operate.
Textualism leads to absurd results because it fails to consider the very purpose of law respected by the community at large. Law is created to protect different human rights. Meaning of words cannot simply be decided by looking up the dictionary, it ought to be construed against the context as Scalia himself has pointed out in Smith v US. However, it is not done by simply finding the public meaning of that particular phrase in question. Instead, the context should include the purpose of enacting that provision. A dictionary-centred textualism makes law unascertainable, leading to inconsistent and absurd results. Embracing the broad purposive approach that considers a wider range of factors including the background and purpose of legislation is the only way to bring hope to
The legal-formalist belief in the capacity of legal rules to determine the outcomes to legal disputes without having recourse to the judge’s political beliefs or sense of fairness has been severely criticised by, amongst others, legal realists and critical legal studies scholars. This assignment will firstly address what legal formalism entails, following which the criticisms of legal formalism will be discussed and lastly whether legal formalism can impede the transformative ideas of the Constitution. All of the above will be analysed to determine the role of legal formalism today.
The workforce has developed rapidly over the years in relation to policy and statutory frameworks, with an emphasis upon the national curriculum in relation to literacy. The frameworks is influenced by political aspects by theoretical and political aspects. This has been reflected within practice as policy brings change and implications for practitioners and managers. Research has gone a long way to implement the revised national curriculum which was due to the concerns raised due to the fact as a country we are falling behind on the national league tables as we are in position 23 (DfEE, 2013), which is quite disappointing as English is our first language within Britain, and we have made no improvements within the last three years (DfEE, 2013).
The expectation from our judges that they will always act objectively in making their decisions is correct but only to a certain extent. By using the theories of interpretation and judicial decision-making of both Dworkin and American Legal Realism, it is evident that a balancing act occurs between objective judgments and interpretation and subjective judgments and interpretation. Often, subjective judgments are the most dominant to a large extent. One must look at the ideas of Dworkin in terms of considering that judgments have aspects of both objectivity and subjectivity. One must also look at the ideas of American Legal Realism where subjectivity plays a gigantic role in judgments leaving objectivity with little or no influence