Introduction:
The issue arising from the Monique’s case is the direct applicability of the Treaty Articles and the direct or indirect effect of Directives, provided by the European Union.
Monique may be able to rely on both Article 18 and 45 of TFEU which concerns any kind of discrimination against EU citizens. The Council Directive 14/08 will be examined whether it is direct or indirect applicable, or if it can be applicable under the principle of state liability. In the case where one of the above can be established, Monique will be able to seek compensations against either Conker Plc or the United Kingdom’s State for non-implementation of the directive.
Treaty Articles – Direct Effect:
In 1974, when the European Council was created, all countries decided that treaties will be agreed together and they cannot be enforceable if they are not approved democratically from all Member States. Treaties are at the top of the European Union’s hierarchy and they are primary legislations which give rights to Member states and European citizens but also create obligations to the European States to implement the “new law” into their own domestic law. Also, Treaties sets the European Union’s constitutional basis and, as stated in the case of Costa, they cannot be overridden by any national law.
Articles 3,4 and 6 of the TFEU provides the areas where European Union have exclusive competences, shared and supporting competences respectively and the Union shall act only within the
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European Law is very complex law , within EU law there is various different treaties which are in place. Two most significant treaties which have importance to the legislative process are The Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union.
This change is perhaps most evident when compared to Van Duyn v Home Office where it was established that Directives could have vertical direct effect. It was said that the usefulness of a directive ’would be weakened if individuals were prevented from relying on it before their national courts’, and that ecluding direct effect ‘would be incompatible with the binding effect attributed to a directive by article 189. Interestingly the language used in the case relating to weakness and incompatibility, seems to imply that this ruling on direct effect was made primarily solely as a means of making sure that their legal basis and legitimacy were not undermined by the omissions of the state rather than being a means for indiviuals to act positively to affirm their own
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‘The jurisprudence of the Courts of Justice of the European Communities has, of course, established that the law of the communities, whether embodied in regulations or directives, must be given primacy, where it is applicable, over the domestic law of the member States.’ …‘
6. All new EU Treaties must be ratified by each Member State according to its own constitutional provisions.
Exclusive Competence is that the EU has full power to legislate and is given complete responsibility to act. The European Commission has taken the view that an area falls within the exclusive competence of the EU if the Treaties impose on it a duty to act, and it is given sole responsibility
Furthermore these democratic foundations were further “reinforced” with the conditionality’s of membership adopted at the Copenhagen Summit in June 1993, whereby democratic governance and human rights were included in its criteria for membership. Furthermore, the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 formally established a Common Foreign and Security Policy which included objectives of which included the development and consolidation of democracy. The EU as Lucarelli argues hence became a strong instrument for the promotion and development of democracy in Europe and but especially in post-communist ones. This Furthermore, the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 reaffirmed its strong democratic position through Article 6:
Sabena concerning an air hostess who won her claim when relying on Article 199 in relation to equal pay. Both parties accepted that discrimination was present however the issue was as to whether Defrenne had rights under EU law and whether direct effect could apply to her case. The case met the criterion set in the Van Gen den Loos case; Therefore, EU law was applicable. However, in the case of R v Secretary of State, the applicant sought to use the Articles 198 and 199. The court held that they were statements of aspirations rather than clear and detailed, therefore this would not generate direct effect. This suggests that direct effect provides sufficient redress for individuals provided the criterion is
There are two types of direct effect: Horizontal, between private individuals and Vertical, between individuals and the state. This is fact that direct effect is not clearly stated in any of the EU Treaties. The Treaty articles has direct effect, such as, Van Gend En Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen principle of direct effect set out in this case and gave full authority to the EEC Treaty. This case provided a flurry of activity in the Court of Justice, which created many of judgements and brining about further integration, such as the primacy of EU law as stated in Costa v ENEL 1964 . This case is further endorsement that under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), a court is responsible to refer cases that have reached the highest point of appeal in their own country, if there is a question of the application of EU Law. Costa had reached its highest point of
was facilitated by the decision taken by the European Commision (EC) in 1993 that all member
The doctrine has evolved in 3 stages. It must be noted that there are two circumstances where indirect effect will not come to the rescue of individuals granted entitlements by Directives. One is where there is no national measure to interpret and the other is where the national legislation contradicts the Directives. The first stage began in Von Colson. It was held that the national courts are required to interpret national law in light of the Directive in the requirement of EU law. The case offered two possibilities for individuals not protected by direct effect. It allowed them to invoke Directives even where the provision was not sufficiently justifiable to be direct effect. Litigants can also rely on this in cases against private parties. However, it applies only in rare circumstances where national laws were implementing Directives and a national provision was highly
The principle of supremacy of European Union (EU) law has been established over the course of more than five decades. It is a principle that was established by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 1964, and it has continued to have a rich history in the jurisprudence of the ECJ and national constitutional courts. As the ECJ and national courts attempt to define their respective realms of influence, a bright debate has sparked regarding constitutional pluralism. Moreover, the recent codification of primacy in the Constitutional Treaty has led to a new debate on the scope of the supremacy of EU law.
Under Art. 267, only ‘court or tribunal’ of a member state may initiate preliminary reference to the ECJ, however through succeeding case law this has been expanded by allowing entities whose members may not be judges, ‘provided that those entities have the power to adjudicate disputes’12. This concept of a court or tribunal has been interpreted widely as it is a matter of union law13. The Advocate-General in De Coster14 criticised the court’s approach and criteria to the interpretation as he deemed it confusing. The court in this instance accepted the reference, as ‘it was a permanent body established in law, that it gives legal rulings and that the jurisdiction is compulsory’15. The court in further cases has treated tribunals as not only tax appeal like in the case above but also; customs, social security and immigration.
However again this higher status can be seen as limited as is only assumed from a written obligation. Therefore to asses if supremacy is not the challenge to member state sovereignty that is appears to be, a close analysis of how the CJEU has dealt with the issue of supremacy of EU law in case law is needed, firstly looking at Van Gend en Loos which stated that the ‘EU was a new legal order permanently limiting the sovereign rights of the Member State’. This customs case helped establish the ‘relationships between the European Union and international law…to grantee that the rules of one system are complied with in another legal order ’ showing in practise that if on a national level EU law is breached CJEU will take supremacy and comply with ‘the integrity of the EU legal order’ . Further evaluation of the limits of the supremacy can be seen in the case of Costa V ENEL where ‘Italy had claimed that the EU treaties…had been transposed into the Italian legal order by national legislation, which could therefore be derogated by subsequent national legislation. The court rejected this presumption of the supremacy of national law by insisting on the supremacy of EU law’ . This case holds significance as it ‘is well-known since Costa V ENEL the court has affirmed the supremacy of Community law over national law’ strongly suggesting the continued existence of EU supremacy is not frequently