The law in relation to co-ownership interests in property has changed a vast amount in recent years. This has resulted in both changes in the legislative framework surrounding co-ownership; the development of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 (TOLATA) , also due to the increase in occurrence of co-ownership many practical problems have been revealed which the Law of Property Act 1925 simply did not clearly provide for. Additionally, changes within the society and economic influences have triggered many problems on the path towards property ownership. The Law of Property Act 1925 (LPA), established the original scheme of co-ownership, however it was incapable of dealing with this change in time.
In this scenario, a considerable amount depends on whether Emma owns a share in the house or, in other words whether she has a proprietary interest in it. If Emma is able to establish that she has this interest then she may be able entitled to a share within the property. When the property was purchased it was done so in David’s name. The purchase is by mortgage and by cash deposit. David has paid the entire cash deposit, as he is the sole legal owner of the property as well as this, the mortgage is made with him. Aforementioned, the title is registered in his name alone and there is no express declaration of trust in writing in favour of Emma.
The Pettit case and many decisions made subsequently; for example, Lloyds Bank v Rosset Stack , Abbot v Abbot
This causes a need to incorporatefor flexible and modern laws which encourage consumers and producers to “conveniently … raise finance …on the security of such property”[2] which encourage investment which in turn leads to the creation of wealth.
in many of the previous court cases, the rulings have been linked to a Case Law that was made in
The case was brought forward to the NSW Supreme Court in 2001 whereby Judge Hulme ordered both Respondents as negligent. This decision was reversed by the Supreme Court of Appeal whereby the judgement was granted in favour of the Respondents. This case affirms the previous decision.
The property rights of women during most of the nineteenth century were dependent upon their marital status. Once women married, their property rights were governed by English common law, which required that the property women took into a marriage, or acquired subsequently, be legally absorbed by their husbands. Furthermore, married women could not make wills or dispose of any property without their husbands' consent. Marital separation, whether initiated by the husband or wife, usually left the women economically destitute, as the law offered them no rights to marital property. Once married, the only legal avenue through which women could reclaim property was widowhood.
It was more than this though, this was a test case, to see if the court would prosecute
In 1819, McCullogh v. Maryland took place. McCullogh, a business manager, is taxed twice, once at a state level, and once at a federal level. Thinking this is unjust, McCullogh sues Maryland and McCullogh wins. This court case declares national supremacy over banking.
be described. Jurisdictional requirements for this case as well as the reasons why it was heard at
Amanda offered John market value for his share which she did not have to do. According to Bankton, Amanda could have stated any price. The market value of a property has only become more substantial in later modern cases. As Craig Anderson states: “In the modern cases, by contrast, what has typically been asked is simply for the defender to be compelled to sell up to the pursuer at a market valuation.” An example of a modern case which has similar circumstances to the present case of Amanda and John is the case of Gray v Kerner. In Gray v Kerner ‘a house was co-owned by the parties and after the breakdown of their relationship the pursuer sought to buy out the defenders shares and for his share of mortgage payments. The defender, however, wanted divison and sale of the property. The sheriff sided with the pursuer as her family life should not be disrupted by biding on the house in an open market and no inconvenience was caused to the defender.’ This is a significant case as the facts of the case are similar to that of Amanda
1) Opie cannot claim possession because North Carolina statutes state that in a joint tenancy with right of survivorship, the land is automatically transferred to the other or in this case, the last living joint tenant. This supersedes any conveyance made in the will. Additionally, Opie did not occupy the land. Ernest did. In order for there to be a claim for adverse possession, there must be an adherence to the conditions in the adverse possession doctrine.
In our situation, we are looking at four cases, Harris v. First Federal Savings, Van Stan v. Fancy Colours, McGrath v. Fahey and Pavilon v. Kaferly.
The organisation, Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd, claimed a dairy farm in New South Wales. The Husband, in his ability as executive of the organisation, exchanged title of the land to both himself and his wife as joint occupants in like manner. The spouse later moved his enthusiasm for the property to his wife for $1. An Application was brought by the organisation against the spouse and wife in the New South Wales Supreme Court looking for that the property be exchanged back to the organisation because of fraudulent activities of the spouse. The trial judge requested that the spouse pay remuneration to the organisation, however dismissed the procedures against the wife as she herself was not a knowing party to the fraud.
It is often conceptualized that property is the rights of 'ownership'. In common law property is divided
In Lewisham Borough Council v Roberts[10], a case concerning delegation of power of requisition, Lord Denning affirmed that the Council ”cannot grant a lease or create any legal interest in the land…because it has itself no estate in the land out of which to carve any interest.” More recently, Neuberger J. in Re Friends Provident Life Office[11] reassured “a lease involves not only a contract, but also an estate in land”[12]. Therefore, the traditional concepts are long-standing principle and the possibility of leases existing merely in contractual nature and granting “tenant” merely contractual rights are denied by courts.
2. Describe briefly the history of the litigation of this case (which courts heard the case, which way did they rule, what court is now deciding the case, which judges are hearing the case in this court)?
The mortgagor and the mortgagee both have different rights. Section 96(1) LPA gives the mortgagor the right to investigate the deeds and make duplicates, so far it is done at a sensible time and any expenses brought about by the mortgagee are paid. The mortgagee is entitled to ensure the mortgaged land and to charge the premiums to the mortgagor by adding