The Major Lessons For The Military Strategy 2015 ( Nms )

Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.

The United States from the Cold War and into the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) continues to face challenges in translating military might into political desires due to its obsession with raising an army, electing politicians and assembling a diplomatic corp that continue to gravitate towards State-to-State engagements that if not rectified could lead to substantial delays in fighting terrorism and non-terrorist adversaries or worse total failure of the United States Military’s ability to properly carry out it’s politicians objectives due to being blindsided.

However, this external trust has been fraying from the edges for many years – clear and realistic political strategy has been lacking from civilian leaders, a well-meaning yet disengaged public, and an insular military class that fails to organically adapt to emerging technologies. A clear and realistic political strategy determined by civilian leaders addresses the first leg of the strategic triad – government. It is said success begins at the top, with a cohesive vision and unified guidance. One doesn’t have to look further than the 2003 invasion of Iraq - then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld claimed it would require no more than 150,000 troops to secure Iraq, despite the insistence of then Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki that it would take 300,000 troops, a number derived from his experience in Bosnia. (Mills, 2013) However, this detail overshadows the deeper implication – that civilian leaders were not planning for stability operations, or had a plan in place after the conventional phase of the war. The lack of guidance and vision from the nation’s strategic leaders make it extremely difficult, if not impossible for the military to effectively prosecute

In the future, technology and digital systems will continue to play an important role in how the United States Army fights and wins our nation’s wars. As technology improves and becomes an increasingly integral part of every Army system, it is important that leaders maintain the ability to fight and win without these benefits. Over reliance on digital systems and unfettered information is a weakness that our enemies will exploit on future battlefields. Ukraine learned this lesson very devastatingly in the recent annexation of Crimea. In order to safeguard the trust emplaced on leaders by the American people, it is a lesson not repeated by the US

The development of the allied military strategy in World War II (WWII) presented challenges for the U.S. and Great Britain as they worked together to defeat the Axis powers. First, this paper will review the environment at the time of WWII when Admiral Stark penned the “Plan Dog” memorandum and MAJ Wedemeyer’s War Defense Team put together the “Victory Plan”. Next, it will look at the advantages and disadvantages of coalition operations with supporting examples. Then, a review of two major meetings between U.S. and Great Britain will identify what strategic decisions were made and the effects they have on the war. Finally, this paper will explore the foundations of strategy (Clausewitz and Sun Tzu) by which the allied forces used and

Our nation’s military continuously evolves to ensure success in future operations. This change is only be possible if our top leaders work in concert towards a common goal. The purpose of this document is to highlight how General Stanley McChrystal changed the manner in which the U.S. Military operates and communicates in an ever-changing environment.

There are no universal theories to explain the true nature and character of war, and any war theories are not a fact or absolute truth. All strategic principles are dynamic and contextual, so “every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions.” The battlefield environment of the 21st century will be the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous, and nature of war will be completely different because of the Revolution in Military Affairs. Highly advance communication and information technologies, a dramatic increase in computing capabilities, developed of precision munitions, dominant air and space power ‘war could be waged by the projection of

Analysis of Allied military strategy in World War II illustrates Dale Eikmeier’s concept of operational approach, the importance of the Arcadia Conference, and the influence and speculative approval of classical military naval and aerospace theorists. The operational approach in “Plan Dog” and the “Victory Plan” addressed Eikmeier’s operational approach design question. The approval of the Germany First strategy made the Arcadia Conference the most important conference between Allied strategists. The adherence to Clausewitz and Sun Tzu by the United States and Great Britain, respectively, accounted for disagreements over strategy. The Allied application of sea power more closely followed naval theorist Julian Corbett than Alfred

With the emphasis on determining the centers of gravity that the insurgents use to gain freedom of movement, the planning becomes one within the national security and military strategy.(Richter 2009, 2) The political and military connections between themselves lay in how the military objectives are seen and similarly how the national security objectives are seen as well, in supporting the allies of the United States.(Richter 2009, 2) The connection between national security as well as the armed forces objectives are seen in the information that is collected as well as the collection capabilities. (Crystal N.D.,2) Information Superiority is one that allows for decision makers as well as military commanders to plan operations with more information to ensure the success of Information operations. (Crystal N.D.,3) The shift in technology as well as the concepts of operations will only become more sophisticated in the future, leading to more emphasis on Information Operations to secure a success on a military objective or a political objective. (Crystal N.D.,3) In the coming future, the need for information operations to become more widely accepted and advance with the technology of the times, will determine the success or failure of political intentions or military

Unconventional Warfare (UW) use as a strategic option is undersold due to a lack of understanding. The lack of understanding cause further political constraints and leads to interagency bickering. Military leaders need to do better at articulating the merits of UW as a viable and strategic option.

There are two important military theorists that have emerged from the French Revolution. Antoine-Henri Jomini, and Carl von Clausewitz both were considered the brightest military thinkers of the time. Jomini’s The art of war is the best military document of the time and consists of six military, branches they are statesmanship, strategy, grand tactics, logistics, engineering and minor tactics. Jomini’s ideas and thought’s on statesmanship and its relation to war, strategy, grand tactics, logistics, and engineering characterize the nature of WWI better than Clausewitz and can be clearly seen the operational art of WWI.

The concept of airpower and its effectiveness against the enemy’s fielded military forces is well documented in a number of literatures. In the history of American military, airpower has been considered not only as the sharpest military sword but also a highly versatile set of tools used to effectively promote national strategy. Airpower’s effectiveness in support of national strategy has significantly improved since 1945. The study of airpower exposed certain consistencies which have affected its effectiveness. The theory and practice of airpower filled the past century with frequently persuasive victories coupled with a historical documentation packed with arguable failures. It is important to note that the effectiveness of airpower, as a military operational strategy, has triggered a debate among proponents and non-proponents. Some airpower theorists have debated its effectiveness. Throughout history, the many claims about airpower’s decisiveness to independently win wars or conflicts have hindered the notional and real application of this instrument of power. This essay highlights factors which consider the scope of the strengths and limitations of airpower that has been and will continue to be effective throughout the 21st century.

The 'Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) case study is regarding the U.S-Philippines partnership in counter-terrorism (CT) operations that took place from 2002-2011. The CT operation was titled as 'Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-PHILIPPINES (OEF-P) and was conducted by the partnership of Philippine security forces and US Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P). The CT cooperation took place at three levels, tactical, operational, and strategic. The role of JSOTF was that of 'advise and assist' whereby ground operations were conducted by the Philippine forces. The US cooperation for CT in Philippines was guided by the Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, and a policy and action framework to act as a binding framework for conducting joint, interagency, and multinational CT operations using full range of military operational capacity. The OEF-P was also conducted by incorporating JP 5-0 principles and guidelines of engagement. The OEF-P took place in Southern Philippines. Following is an assessment how the US forces used termination, military end state, and objectives of operational design (Joint Pub 5-0, page III-18) to develop and refine their operational approach.

Clausewitz defines war as an “act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” The nature of war is enduring yet the character of war changes over time. Current US strategic guidance is advancing the point of view that since the character of war has changed to focus on irregular wars then the US military should prepare for a future of irregular wars. This shift in focus forgets that the nature of war is enduring and in order to be successful, we must prepare for all types of conflict. This paper will define the types of conflict and the likelihood of each followed by a discussion of US strategic guidance and ending with an analysis of the training resources and force structure requirements needed to achieve success for all types of

What is the nature of military power and how should it be used to serve national interests? These fundamental questions form the foundation of military strategy. Various answers developed by civilian and military theorists over the past century all center on the idea of controlling conflict by rationally applying military power to achieve a desirable outcome. However, as economic, social, and political contexts evolve, they redefine ideas about power, its utility, and its application. As a result of this reciprocal relationship, theories of strategy, itself an amorphous concept, change. Corbett’s Some Principle of Maritime Strategy, Slessor’s Air Power and Armies, Wylie’s Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control, and