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The Schelling Segregation Model

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Introduction

In this essay, I aim to show that given Carl Hempel’s (1942) deductive-nomological (DN) theory of explanation and Bas C. van Fraassen’s (1980) pragmatic theory of explanation, Schelling only partially explains neighbourhood segregation, because multiple causal factors and background conditions ought to be taken into account. I will first outline how Schelling explains neighbourhood segregation, and then discuss the following aspects to show my conclusion:

1. Schelling’s model in the context of the DN theory of explanation
2. Schelling’s model in the context of the pragmatic theory of explanation
3. How to explain neighbourhood segregation…

An emphasis will be placed on the first and second to allow more thorough …show more content…

To make room for newcomers and to resolve issues of empty units, Schelling assumes that individuals adhere to the “rule of movement” . This rule implies that innocuous individual preferences characterised by assumption (vi) will give rise to a gradual distribution of a spatial phenomenon: the population in groups A and B start to separate out. Schelling identifies this separation between groups A and B as a “stable equilibrium” .

For an illustration, consider Schelling’s two-dimensional model below:

Figure 1 justifies Schelling’s theory, in that seemingly innocuous individual preferences – a person’s desire for same-colour neighbours, and reluctance to be in the minority – can trigger changes in a system from one stable equilibrium to another, and hence result in neighbourhood segregation.

However, many scholars further articulate Schelling’s model under different circumstances with focuses ranging from the dynamics of movement to the population densities of local mixed neighbourhoods. The following point is worth noting.

It is unclear why individuals often decide to swap locations given that one is free to leave the neighbourhood at any time. In response, an added premise to Schelling’s initial assumptions is required. In Zhang’s Schelling-type checkerboard model, he shows that individuals decide to swap locations on the basis of their own “payoffs” . Given that individuals of groups A and B can compromise on a mutually advantageous

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