War is a phenomenon that has always been, it is, and will be an essential part of human existence. It is all about exercising control, and/or imposing own will on the others. War can be described through its nature and character. There is an indispensable relationship between war, policy, and strategy. For better understanding of the war, its nature, characteristics, causes, and how the war can be waged, we need to understand the influence of policy, and the importance of strategy. Strategy is formulated to support the policies; it represents the alignment of ends, ways, and means, all of which is considered against risk, to achieve goals. The theories of war and strategy have been written in different periods throughout time. Those theories are widely studied, and they still influence modern policies, international relations, strategies, and definitively ways of wars (how wars are conducted). Among the theories and theorists of war, neither one of them alone can sufficiently explain and provide complete answers on the nature and the character of war in the twenty-first century. It is not wrong to say that the nature of war has changed very little, if at all, but the character of war has changed a lot. The purpose of my paper is to provide a brief overview of the current strategic environment and to show that Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, together, are the most relevant for 21st century warfare. To be more specific, the paper will provide arguments that war today is still a
Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.
The concept of war as a static and unchanging occurrence is an outdated and dangerous miscalculation. More accurately, war is a fluidic, evolving and shifting phenomenon constantly reinventing itself, rendering stagnant, inflexible principles potentially disastrous. Consequently, as students of war and future players in this transforming theatre, the study of eras of significant development is an extremely relevant pursuit. Recognizing the need for adaptation and the creation of doctrine is now a prerequisite for any effective modern commander. War is unpredictable in nature and particularly so in current theatres of operation, in which change is rapid
Clausewitz’s attack of enemy centers of gravity and Sun Tzu’s prioritization of attack of important elements of national power provide contrasting approaches to the development of effective strategy. These contrasts are reflections of each author’s perspective on how war should be waged, the proper use of force, their definitions of the ideal victory and how best to achieve that victory as well as their methodologies,
In the year of 1792, a twelve year old boy named Carl von Clausewitz enlisted in the Prussian army for war, and soon after appearing in such battles as Jena-Auerstädt and Waterloo, became dedicated in conflict and its reasons for their results most of his life. By being alive at the same time as Napoleon's rise and fall, Carl von Clausewitz was able to document and relate how war was fought, won, and lost. It's important to comprehend that in his writings, he is relaying why it is pertinent to think about how war is fought, not how to win a war. Clausewitz' theories described in “On War,” are not only effective in wars fought in today's time and past, but will remain current in future endeavors, due to its generic layout of
Carl Von Clausewitz and Helmuth Moltke the Elder were both practitioners and theorists of the war art in the 19th century. Their military thoughts on war’s character and its dynamics have influenced the later militaries in the conduct of war. Particularly, the Clausewitzian concept of the “culminating point of victory” and the Moltke’s principle of “Auftragstaktik”, or mission type tactics by a decentralized command were implemented and culminated in the battlefield of World War II. Moreover, today, the US Army has adopted both concepts in its latest refined “AirLand Battle” doctrine recognizing their importance in the operational art of modern warfare.
The notion of an American way of war informs how scholars, policymakers, and strategists understand how Americans fight. A way of war—defined as a society’s cultural preferences for waging war—is not static. Change can occur as a result of important cultural events, often in the form of traumatic experiences or major social transformations. A way of war is therefore the malleable product of culturally significant past experiences. Reflecting several underlying cultural ideals, the current American way of war consists of three primary tenets—the desire for moral clarity, the primacy of technology, and the centrality of scientific management systems—which combine to create a preference for decisive, large-scale conventional wars with clear objectives and an aversion to morally ambiguous low-intensity conflicts that is relevant to planners because it helps them address American strategic vulnerabilities.
What is the Just War theory and how did it pertain to St. Augustine? According to Augustine there is no private right to kill. According to Paul Ramsey opposes in The Just War, Christian participation in warfare “was not actually an exception to the commandment, “you shall not murder” but instead an expression of the Christian understanding of moral and political responsibility. One can kill only under the authority of God. St. Augustine argued that Christian rulers had such an obligation to make peace for the protection of his subjects even if the only way to eliminate such a threat was through force of arms. St. Augustine believed that in wars there was a right intention.
War is a human endeavor. Humanity continually pursues solutions to counter evolving threats with the end of preserving power while also enabling peace. Civilizations resort to war to maintain their perception of this equilibrium. Defined threats and adversaries have changed throughout history, however, the essence of human nature and the base concept of conflict itself have not. Carl von Clausewitz’s theories on warfare capture the relationship between humanity and its application of war, remaining relevant in today’s era through their pensive explanations of timeless philosophical principles regarding the concept of war. These theories regarding war in politics, the key factors affecting war, and the extent that war is applied are inherently interconnected, providing insight on the relationships between humanity and its application of war.
The western way of war consists of five foundations that have shaped a significant amount of military cultures; the foundations are superior technology, discipline, a finance system, innovation, and military tradition. Perhaps people believe that discipline is not one of the most important foundations of the western way of war, since people tend to emphasize technology. However, discipline is the key to maximizing the other four foundations before and during conflict. Historian Geoffrey Parker agrees that technology can give a military advantage, but it is not sufficient without superior discipline. That is because discipline consists of the ability of armies to act within battle plans even when not supervised, obey orders, exercise loyalty, and restrain their fears when faced with danger. Discipline as a western way of war has influenced military cultures from the Roman Empire to today’s militaries. Discipline shaped military cultures by how they prepared for war, effectively giving them the ability to act during combat and expanding commander’s operational reach, thus aiding in conflicts throughout history and increasing the likelihood of defeating the adversary.
There are no universal theories to explain the true nature and character of war, and any war theories are not a fact or absolute truth. All strategic principles are dynamic and contextual, so “every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions.” The battlefield environment of the 21st century will be the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous, and nature of war will be completely different because of the Revolution in Military Affairs. Highly advance communication and information technologies, a dramatic increase in computing capabilities, developed of precision munitions, dominant air and space power ‘war could be waged by the projection of
The influence of various theories and concepts on the conduct World War I has generated a range of studies in an attempt to understand how and why World War I was fought. Specifically, Clausewitz’s theories on warfare have come under a considerable amount of scrutiny with regards to their influence on World War I. This scrutiny has led to the ascertation that the protracted and bloody stalemate of World War I was largely due to a stubborn reliance on Clausewitz’s theories. The question that this paper attempts to address is weather the cause of the bloody and protracted
The Just War Theory is a doctrine founded by Saint Augustine which has helped bring much discussion and debate to wars and the morality to fight in them. Wars and fights between people have gone on forever and are not perceived to stop anytime soon so it is important that some people thought about when and why they should ever fight. For many years Christians never part toke in this fighting due to teachings of the Bible and Jesus' teaching on 'turning the other cheek' and 'live by the sword, die by the sword'. Saint Augustine would be one of the first to talk about how a Christian could be a soldier and serve God at the same time. Through this thought we would receive the Just War Theory which gave a set of requirements for someone to partake
The comprehension of the term ‘total war’ has had great significance towards the understanding as to how wars are fought, affect society and differ from other conflicts. The main issue that arises is conclusively defining total war and is continually differing between both historians and military combatants alike. Roger Chickering defines states “total war is distinguished by its intensity and extent. Theatres of operation span the globe; the scale of the battle is practically limitless” all the while adding “total war requires the mobilisation not only of armed forced but also of whole populations” This definition, while not quintessential is a good starting point for a definition due to its broadness and acceptance of the idea of the incapability to fully mobilise a society’s entire resource. David A. Bell states that it is often defined as ‘a war involving the complete mobilization of a society’s resources to achieve the absolute destruction of an enemy, with all distinction erased between combatants and non-combatants’ . However, he notes the limitations of such an idea including the inability for societies to meet such criterion, in particular, the ability for a society to completely utilise its resources towards the war effort. Ultimately, Jeremey black, while not giving a conclusive definition for the term, total war, does acknowledge different definitions by various individuals distilling many of their arguments and consequently outlining main characteristics of
Carl Von Clausewitz is one of the most well known, as well as important, war theorists in our history. Although he has been dead for almost two decades, he still plays a major role in shaping military thinkers around the world. The reason his theory is somehow still relevant is because of its flexibility. He did not prepare for nuclear warfare or cyber warfare, but you can apply his theory to the 21st century. Clausewitz believed in two levels of war and that war was continuous. Clausewitz believed that when one goes to war, they should have an achievable political objective; "war is the continuation of politics by other means” (Clausewitz, 1832).
Martin van Creveld wrote The Transformation of War book in 1991 when he detailed a predictive hypothesis about the changing character of war into what he called ?Nontrinitarian War. There were conflicts arise as intrastate wars and were not based on the simplified version of Clausewitz?s ?remarkable trinity? of government, people and military forces (Van Creveld, 1991, pg. 49). In his book, Van Creveld offers an account of warfare in the previous millennium and suggests what the future might hold. The drive was that major war was draining and the emergence of forms of war ?that are simultaneously old and new? now threatened to create havoc.