The Weaknesses And Weaknesses Of Phases Iv V And The Initial Strategic Assumptions That Affected Cdruscentcom 's Oa

The lack of clear and well thought strategy in addition to the lack of knowledge and understanding of the Iraqi people lead to the failure in Iraq, which materialized in the form of ISIS.

inadequate communication; lack of supporting firepower; and in the final hour before the raid, absolute

While under Major General David Petraeus, the 101st Airborne Division initially deployed, ready to engage insurgent forces. However, after arriving in Mosul, Iraq the division became heavily involved in a vital reconstruction effort. General Petraeus understood through his previous experiences that in war, reconstruction efforts are inevitable. His critical thinking and problem solving led to a three-pronged strategy to provide a secure environment, to restore basic life services and to facilitate a return to normalcy for the citizens of Mosul. In this paper, I will summarize how General Petraeus used critical thinking, problem solving and the “Screaming Eagles” to earn the hearts and minds of throughout Iraq.

US Central Command’s (CENTCOM) lack of understanding the operational environment led to a poor definition of the problem. The key to understanding the operational environment is the ability to describe the current and desired operational environment. (JPiii8). CENTCOM’s planning did reflect a good understanding of the current operational environment. CENTCOM understood the influences Iraq’s current political structure

To understand how some of the soon to be discussed failures arose, all of the key commanders need to be identified. When Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) began General Tommy Franks was the CENTCOM Combatant Commander in Tampa, Florida. Events on 9/11 lead to us having forces in Afghanistan soon after. From the beginning of the war Special Forces (SOF) were the primary assets utilized. As time went on conventional units were joining the forces in theatre. This caused the need for the Command and Control (C2) structure to adapt to the

The U.S. military? Suffered problems because they had no previous experience on these situations of emergencies

1c. How well do those operational objectives support the attainment of the Theater strategic objective(s)?

In order to develop effective solutions for complex military problems, the Joint Community within the US Military adopted the methodology of Operational Design in Joint Doctrine. This methodology addresses the concept of complex, ill-structured or “wicked” problems. In fact, Lessons Learned as a result of operations conducted over the last 15 years played an instrumental role in the continued development of this doctrine. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) illustrates a perfect case study for evaluation utilizing this methodology. Therefore, the intent of this paper is to evaluate US Military campaign planning for OIF by using operational design as the framework for this analysis. First, this paper looks at how planners and commanders interpreted pre-invasion civilian policy guidance, their understanding of the current operational environment, and how these commanders defined the problem. Next, it identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the initial approach. After discussing this initial approach, this paper examines how commanders assessed the campaign and refined the approach – to include how the reframing occurred. Lastly, it provides examples of how these lessons learned shaped current joint planning policy and doctrine.

The premeditated ideas and strategies that they had were compelled to be changed due to the changes in the government and deaths of some of the government officials that pursue and lead the people (Thomas et al. 2009).. In addition, Petraeus group bear much more responsibility because they were the team behind the scene who control and reinforced the decision that was carried out by the military. Petraeus group include military officer who had numerous years of experience in various aspect of insurgence (Thomas et al.

In a speech given by President Bush, he called the surge “A new way forward”, which indirectly confirmed to many that the White House was aware of the military shortcomings in Iraq. Although the Bush administration most likely had the best of intentions, there are a few key reasons the Iraqi surge did not have sustained positive results. The surge strategy was to increase the number of troops in Iraq by 20,000; these troops would be used in urban civilian areas where military forces have had a difficult time clearing out neighborhoods. The surge was initially a success, however, after several months it became clear the success was short-lived, and the overall strategy was short sighted. Members of Al Qaeda simply left the region while it was heavily occupied, only to return when the U.S. threat had vacated the area. There was a survey conducted by Iraq, and the overwhelming majority of Iraqi citizens felt that daily living conditions had not changed they were in favor of American troops leaving their country. Although the primary goal of improving the lives of citizens was not fully realized, there is a bigger flaw with the surge, it had aimed to reduce American and Iraqi casualties, as well as lower the number of Al Quad attacks. As already stated, these surges did have some fleeting success, which were able to produce statistics that briefly pacified many critics of the war,

Within days of Iraqi forces invading Kuwait in 1990, President Bush publicly backed the United Nations’ (UN) stance on the incursion with four national strategic objectives and determined that, ‘if invited, US forces would be deployed to deter further Iraqi attacks, defend Saudi Arabia and enforce UN resolutions.’ From the national strategic objectives, the military end-state is deduced. The military end-state is a conceptual element of operational design which describes the conditions that forces must achieve to attain strategic objectives/ hand over main effort responsibilities. The military end-state does not necessarily indicate the end of a military activities to attain national objectives. While one specific national objective would not

As demonstrated in the evolution of the three phases, the U.S. response was reactionary, gradual, and limited despite an ever-increasing commitment. In many regards, this was due to the political climate, overall lack of strategy and clearly defined objectives, as well as a failure to understand the enemy. Meanwhile the enemy mobilized and engaged in total war for unification while evolving its tactics to counter U.S. weaponry, air power, and

The disbanding of the Iraqi army and “debathification” or dismantling of the government in place only served to increase the casualties of American troops and Iraqi civilians as the radical Sunni insurgency expanded. This point of cause and effect, clash of two distinct political and cultural worlds, defined this war for the generation serving, at home and the future generations. The threat of increasing terrorism after the attack of September 11, 2001 was one of the driving force of invasion of Iraq. However, in one analysis the increase of global terrorism today is told to be well contributed by the conflicts that were fueled by the western presence in Iraq and the surrounding

The events that were described in this case study sounds to me as if they started off with the planning model of Rational Planning. I say this due to the fact that all the right parties were alerted to what needed to be done with goals being said and set to be put into place for starters. This did help with the main concerns being priorities and kept to along with formations being followed with effective organized tactics. They were put into place after the goals were set and made. As I read this case study and from my understandings this war was being analyzed and evaluated by senior officers in Washington who all had different ways and structures they thought

As seen through today’s prism of operational art and design, the U.S. military’s campaign planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) was not successful. This failure resulted from flaws in the planning process itself, and the conclusions that flowed from that process. The lack of adequate advance planning for Phase IV stability or transition operations proved especially problematic. This contributed directly to rising levels of violence in Iraq, and indirectly to increased public scrutiny of the war at home. Throughout 2006, the U.S. public, pundits and military planners debated the way forward in Iraq. The plan that emerged from this period, known as the surge, successfully overcame the deficiencies in the initial planning and execution