Theater Campaign Plans (TCP)

Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF): The GEF consolidates and integrates DOD strategic planning guidance. Moves DOD from a “contingency-centric” to a “s

Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) are the vital link between those who determine national security policy and strategy and the military forces or subordinate JFCs that conduct military operations within their AORs [JP-1]. GCCs takes on a lot of responsibility they are normally responsible for a large geographical area; not mention the effective coordination of operations within that area falls on the shoulder of the GCC. Directives flow from the President and SecDef through CJCS to the GCCs, who plan and conduct the operations that achieve national or multinational strategic objectives. GCCs provide guidance and direction through strategic estimates, command strategies, and plans and orders for the employment of military force. One plan

Training objectives must support the mission profile and meet the commanders desired end state. Prior to the 56TH train up at the National Training Center (NTC) the deployment location changed from Iraq to Afghanistan (case study). Changes to mission essential tasks were not identified prior to NTC, resulting in the BCT training on collective tasks and validated during MRE based on the Iraq mission profile. However, the shift to the Afghanistan mission profile created gaps in training not identified until units arrived at Bagram Air Field (BAF). i.e. the BCT had to establish an MRAP drivers training program at BAF extending the RSOI process. Training gaps were not limited to company level shortfalls as battalion and brigade staffs were not able to anticipate potential threats and capitalize on opportunities. (case study 2)

While analyzing the North Africa conflict, a combination of service capabilities would be required to achieve the desired end state of deterring and if necessary, the defeat of Algerian guerilla aggression to prevent regional and global destabilization. Taking into account the current military landscape that exists today, a joint task force (JTF) would be the ideal military response of the United States and collation partner’s while utilizing the regional military assets. Intelligence suggests guerilla forces are capable of a full scale offensive into Morocco in less than 36 hour notice, bringing the factors of time, force and space into consideration.

Joint operation planning begins when an appropriate authority recognizes potential for military capability to be employed in response to a potential or actual crisis. At the strategic level, that authority—the president, SecDef, or

In support of my capstone project, I assessed and will submit a redesigned proposal with developmental recommendations for reformation of a solid POI for the SPCC that takes place at the Army Logistics University. In this, I have identified the foremost purpose for this redesign as the following: The investment in the education and training of rising leadership is vital to the long-term success of our sustainment support staff and the services provided. With this course providing training in modular force operations for newly selected command designees that enables them to function effectively throughout their command tour it is very important to make sure that the training is substantive. Therefore the main focus is to assure that training is current and emerging sustainment doctrine and leadership topics for commanders on the National Guard, Reservist and Active Duty levels is most essential.

While a commander’s staff conducts planning at any level, whether it is strategic, operational, or tactical, the importance of identifying both theirs and the adversary’s center of gravity (COG) is a critical part of the planning process. Three factors should be carefully analyzed in order to gain a full understanding of the COG; they are critical capabilities, critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities (U.S. Office of the CJCS 11 August 2011, III-24). Although a COG can be attacked directly, the indirect approach which seeks to destroy or neutralize the COG by attacking an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities can be a more efficient use of available resources. The United States Marine Corps’ Warfighting publication MCDP 1 draws a direct correlation between a COG and its critical vulnerability by stating, “we should focus our efforts against a critical vulnerability, a vulnerability that, if exploited, will do the most significant damage to the enemy 's ability to resist us” (United States Marine Corps 1997, 47). The Marine Corps favors the indirect approach to defeating an adversary’s COG because the functions assigned to them by the Department of Defense (DoD) require expeditionary operations and expeditionary forces typically are limited in size, assets, and resources driving them to target an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities.

After reviewing The AOC, TP 525-3-1, which describes how the United States Army will employ forces and capabilities in complex

The Joint Force Commander (JFC) utilizes command and control to exercise authority over assigned and attached forces within his or her command. Command provides direction and motivation to individuals and units, whereas control is the task of managing forces and the associated tasks required to accomplish the mission. Effective command and control successfully balances the art of command with the science of control and strengthens the commander’s ability to make and execute decisions. Mission command advances command and control

The US Central Command’s planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was not the all-inclusive plan that joint operations require. Joint operations are no longer limited to major combat operations, but encompass a wide range of actions. Planning for joint operations requires input from many sources to produce a successful campaign plan to meet the desired end state. Operational design provides a concept and a construction framework that underpins a campaign and its execution. (JP GL13). Evaluating the planning process by using the operational design identifies some of CENTCOM’s shortfalls. US military planners’ lack of understanding of the operational environment led to an inadequately defined problem that resulted in a faulty operational approach. CENTCOM’s approach did not have the right assessment to gauge the effectiveness of the plan such as alerting planners when and if the plan needed modification. Current joint planning policy incorporates several of CENTCOM’s shortfalls in an attempt to provide a better planning process for future joint operations.

The established CMOC “will integrate and synchronize interagency, intergovernmental organization (IGO), and nongovernmental organization (NGO) activities with joint force operations”.6

"The first step of formal COA development is to review and update facts, assumptions, and forces available that were identified during mission analysis. The second step is to generate conceptual possibilities to support the [mission]" (Artillerization, n.d., "Step 3: Course of Action Development" section, ¶ 1). It is recommended that several COAs be developed during this step. During this step the author would identify which type of equipment was needed to support the CLP to ensure that C3 was available amongst the members of the CLP and between the leadership of the CLP and higher headquarters.

The Army’s Strategic Goal is to provide the Joint Force Commander (JFC) with forces prepared to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution. (United States, 2014)

The 'Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) case study is regarding the U.S-Philippines partnership in counter-terrorism (CT) operations that took place from 2002-2011. The CT operation was titled as 'Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-PHILIPPINES (OEF-P) and was conducted by the partnership of Philippine security forces and US Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P). The CT cooperation took place at three levels, tactical, operational, and strategic. The role of JSOTF was that of 'advise and assist' whereby ground operations were conducted by the Philippine forces. The US cooperation for CT in Philippines was guided by the Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, and a policy and action framework to act as a binding framework for conducting joint, interagency, and multinational CT operations using full range of military operational capacity. The OEF-P was also conducted by incorporating JP 5-0 principles and guidelines of engagement. The OEF-P took place in Southern Philippines. Following is an assessment how the US forces used termination, military end state, and objectives of operational design (Joint Pub 5-0, page III-18) to develop and refine their operational approach.

As military members we are educated to think very linearly about strategy. For many years we have been trained to have a strategic thought process based on the use of a methodology that espouses three major steps: Ends (Objectives), Ways (Strategic Concepts), and Means (Resources). (Barber 1997)