What Makes A Bat?

But, in another section of Jackson’s article, he refers back to the famous article What is it Like to Be a Bat?, written by the philosopher Thomas Nagel, to help strengthen his argument against physicalism. Jackson states how there is no amount of physical information that could possibly tell us what it is like to be anything other than a human being (Jackson 416-417). For instance, the dualist would say that I cannot possibly understand what it is like to actually be a dog. Even if I were able to obtain all the possible physical information there is about dogs, according to the dualist, I would still be missing the actual experience of being a dog. However, the physicalist would still argue that, although I am not a dog, I can still know the physical information about what it is like to be a dog and know how they perceive and experience everything in life. Then if, some day, I

Consciousness, Thomas Nagel states, “is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable.” Here he refers particularly to phenomenal consciousness, which Block defines as “perceptual experiences,” and Nagel describes as “something that it is to be.’ This experiential element appears to present a challenge to the physicalist assertion that all mental processes are explicable in terms of physical brain states, biochemical reactions and the laws of physics. Frank Jackson presents this argument in his 1982 thesis Epiphenomenal Qualia. Whilst Jackson’s argument occupies a seminal position in philosophy of mind, whether he adds anything new to knowledge of the nature of conscious experience, is debateable. Thomas Nagel’s What is it like to

The evolution of the baseball bat dates back to when baseball was a growing sport. The first wood bats cannot be compared with today’s wood bats, and the BESR bats of the past cannot be compared with the modern BBCOR bats. The first wood baseball bats were considered sticks because they did not have a lot of pop, which is how hard the ball bounces off of the bat. As the wood bat progressed, the ball began to fly farther and travel faster. This change in wood baseball bats can be related to the change in metal bats. When metal bats were first introduced, they were considered inferior to wood bats until the new and improved BESR bats were introduced. These bats had more pop than ever before, and were considered dangerous. Because of this danger, the BBCOR bats had to be introduced in 2011. Because of the major advances in technology, bat manufacturers are able to tune the bats to the BBCOR certifiable level. The introduction of BBCOR bats into college and high school baseball has moved the game in a positive direction by making baseball more realistic, creating a safer game, and making it easier to project a player’s future.

“What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” is American philosopher, Thomas Nagel’s, opinion on the widely debated mind-body problem. Nagel introduces the paper by explaining what it means for something to be conscious. He defines consciousness as an organism’s ability for there to be something it is like to be that organism. Using his definition of consciousness Nagel suggests that physicalism cannot be successfully defended using the popular reductionism theory. This is because in order to be defended a physical account must be given to phenomenological features themselves. This leads Nagel to his argument, “Every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical theory will

The 'mind-body' problem has troubled philosophers for centuries. This is because no human being has been able to sufficiently explain how the mind actually works and how this mind relates to the body - most importantly to the brain. If this were not true then there would not be such heated debates on the subject. No one objects to the notion that the Earth revolves around the sun because it is empirical fact. However, there is no current explanation on the mind that can be accepted as fact. In 'What is it like to be a bat?', Thomas Nagel does not attempt to solve this 'problem'. Instead, he attempts to reject the reductionist views with his argument on subjectivity. He

In David Armstrong’s thought-provoking work titled, The Nature of Mind, he explains that the most convincing way to make sense of the mind-body problem is to approach it in a materialistic way. Specifically, Armstrong shows that the science of physico-chemical processes of the brain is the best way to explain the nature of our mind. He goes on to explain traditional and dispositional behaviorism, and states his own materialistic take on behaviorism. His arguments throughout his paper are very logical, and though there have been arguments against his explanations, he effectively justifies the materialistic view of the mind.

In Nagel’s What Is It Like To Be a Bat, issues regarding consciousness are raised. One such issue is the mind-body problem which, as noted by Nagel, does not seem to fit with reductionist theories. That is, reductionist theories aim to explain things (e.g. persons and/or animal experiences) in relation to physical processes (i.e. organisms are just the sum of their physical parts). However, consciousness does not easily cooperate with such theories because it must be given a physical account. In addition, the nature of consciousness is that it is unique to a specific viewpoint (e.g. we can imagine what it would be for us to be a bat, but we cannot experience the mindset of said organism).

The style of the bat has remained the same for a while now, staying more to what we see today. Now the big difference today is now in the younger ages, they use metal bats instead of wood. This is because balls hit of metal bats go farther. This is because the center of aluminum bats are hollow so, when the ball hits the bat the side of the bat caves in, then it rapidly goes back to normal, slingshotting the ball at higher speed. Also metal bats are less likely to be defective, often if hit right wooden bats will splinter, or break. it is very uncommon for a metal bat to break. Thus is the reason in 1974 the aluminum bat was introduced into college baseball, because the price of new wooden bats were getting pricy. After this the aluminum bat

In his article "What Mary Didn 't Know" Frank Jackson comes up with a convincing argument, which challenges physicalism, a theory of the mind, and its validity. In this paper I will look at Jacksons argument, specifically his second premise, and whether or not his conclusion follows it. I will also attempt to present the objections, which he presented to his paper and the replies he builds against them.

The mind is perhaps the most fascinating part of the human body due to its complexity and ability to rationalize. In essence, the mind-body problem studies the relation of the mind to the body, and states that each human being seems to embody two unique and somewhat contradictory natures. Each human contains both a nature of matter and physicality, just like any other object that contains atoms in the universe. However, mankind also is constituted of something beyond materialism, which includes its ability to rationalize and be self-aware. This would imply that mankind is not simply another member of the world of matter because some of its most distinctive features cannot be accounted for in this manner. There are obvious differences between physical and mental properties. Physical properties are publically accessible, and have weight, texture, and are made of matter. Mental properties are not publically accessible, and have phenomenological texture and intentionality (Stewart, Blocker, Petrik, 2013). This is challenging to philosophers, because man cannot be categorized as a material or immaterial object, but rather a combination of both mind and body (Stewart, Blocker, Petrik, 2013). Man embodies mind-body dualism, meaning he is a blend of both mind and matter (Stewart, Blocker, Petrick, 2013). The mind-body problem creates conflict among philosophers, especially when analyzing physicalism in its defense. This paper outlines sound

In his text “What is it like to be a bat?” of 1974 Thomas Nagel claims that consciousness is the

Nagels uses his hypothetical bat experiment to explain conscious experiences. the question he proposes is that can we as humans feel what it is like to be a bat. But of course, many people stated yes you can because bats have eyes to see just like we do and we can also use a sonar machine to replicate what a bat sees when it uses its ears. But Nagel says no that we will never be able to understand what it's like to be a bat because this experiment shows that there is something that is or is felt by a certain conscious thing that we will never feel. So that is why he chose bats.

Insofar as I can imagine this (which is not very far), it tells me only what it would be like for me to behave as a bat behaves. But that is not the question. I want to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat... - Thomas Nagel

Nagel in his theory argues that “consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable” (Nagel 1). The consciousness is so important in the mind problem because it is the individual experience that cannot be reduced from our personal understanding. That is why Nagel believes some personal identities are beyond human understanding. If we were bats that eat bugs, hang upside-down in an attic and flap arms to fly that imagine maybe will be similar to everyone. But this is what it is like for human to be a bat, not what it is like for bat to be a bat. We will never know what it was like to be a bat due to the subjectivity of conscious experience. The only way we could know what it is like to be a bat will be a bat. But we can know

Assuming that one has to be in a conscious state of mind in order for one to understand what it is like to be something, Nagel starts off his argument with an idea for consciousness. He criticizes the concept of functionalism for disregarding the subjective view of the mind into a purely objective view. Taking into account what he had just stated, Nagel makes his claim: “The fact that [a bat] has conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is something that it is like to be [a bat]” (Nagel 1974, pp. 436). This “what it is like” is the subjective aspect of Nagel’s theory. He suggests that previous theories on the mind-body problem did not capture this “subjective character of experience” (Nagel 1974, pp. 436). The “subjective character of experience” can be defined as the idea that a certain organism can only have conscious experiences that only it can feel. Using the subjective aspect of consciousness, Nagel explains that consciousness cannot be defined through only objective means. I agree in Nagel’s stance that the subjective experience is “not analyzable in terms of any explanatory system of functional states, or intentional states” (Nagel 1974, pp. 436). Nagel’s argument is convincing; when people feel an emotion such as pain, no one really knows how to describe it, for one person’s pain might be completely different from another’s. What is there to say that feelings such as pain could be described purely through objective means? In other words, the