“What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” is American philosopher, Thomas Nagel’s, opinion on the widely debated mind-body problem. Nagel introduces the paper by explaining what it means for something to be conscious. He defines consciousness as an organism’s ability for there to be something it is like to be that organism. Using his definition of consciousness Nagel suggests that physicalism cannot be successfully defended using the popular reductionism theory. This is because in order to be defended a physical account must be given to phenomenological features themselves. This leads Nagel to his argument, “Every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical theory will …show more content…
He explains that reductionism only accounts for reducing the mind to physics. However, it leaves out consciousness. Therefore, according to Nagel, reductionism is inaccurate because it excludes subjective experience. In order to explain his point, Nagel provides the reader with an analogy using bats. He states that the he is able to imagine himself with webbed arms, which permit him to fly around at night catching insects in his mouth. He expands, and says he is able to imagine that he has poor vision and has to use sonar to communicate, and finally he adds that he is able to imagine hanging upside down in an attic. However Nagel clarifies that these things would only explain what it would be like for him to be a bat. The question he wants answered is what it is like for a bat to be a bat? (423). He explains how if one tries to image this, they are restricted by their own mind. By presenting this information Nagel is able to support his claim because one cannot look and behave like another organism without changing their fundamental structure. One’s experiences cannot be anything like the experience from the point of view of another organism
Consciousness, Thomas Nagel states, “is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable.” Here he refers particularly to phenomenal consciousness, which Block defines as “perceptual experiences,” and Nagel describes as “something that it is to be.’ This experiential element appears to present a challenge to the physicalist assertion that all mental processes are explicable in terms of physical brain states, biochemical reactions and the laws of physics. Frank Jackson presents this argument in his 1982 thesis Epiphenomenal Qualia. Whilst Jackson’s argument occupies a seminal position in philosophy of mind, whether he adds anything new to knowledge of the nature of conscious experience, is debateable. Thomas Nagel’s What is it like to
The mind is a complex myriad of thoughts and psychological systems that even philosophers today cannot entirely grapple. It is composed of the senses, feelings, perceptions, and a whole series of other components. However, the mind is often believed to be similar or even the same as the brain. This gives rise to the mind-brain identity theory, and whether there exists a clear distinction between the physical world and the non-material mind. In this paper, I will delineate the similarities and differences between mind and brain, describe the relevant ideas such as functionalism and materialism, and provide explanations on how these theories crystallized. Further, I will discuss the differing views of this concept from multiple philosophers’ perspectives and highlight the significance of each. Ultimately, I will defend the view that the mind-brain identity theory is false by analyzing its errors and examining the invalid assumptions it makes about consciousness.
When contemplating the relationship between the mind and body, most philosophers advocate either dualism, the view that the mind and body belong to the mental and physical categories respectively, or physicalism, the stance that there is only the physical. (Gertler 108) Brie Gertler upholds the former perspective, and her essay In Defense of Mind-Body Dualism aims to disprove physicalism by establishing the possibility of experiencing pain without the firing of C-fibers, which physicalists believe is identical to pain. (110) She claims that thought experiments are best for determining matters of possibility, but only if such experiments utilize “sufficiently comprehensive” concepts. After first clarifying why Gertler emphasizes the need for
Nagel then proceeds with his argument by demonstrating why we cannot know ?what it is like to be a bat?. A human has an imagination and could therefore imagine what it would be like to have the characteristics of a bat. However, a human cannot imagine what it is like for a bat to be a bat. Nagel supports this by saying, ?if I try to imagine this, I am restricted to the resources of my own mind, and those resources are inadequate to the task.? (p.536). I agree with Nader on this point. In order for me to experience what it would be like to be a bat I would have to make the actual transformation to a bat and there is no way for me to do that. The only other possible way for this to occur would be by a proper explanation about the mind of a bat but this too
Many philosophers have considered the mystery of consciousness to be a “hard problem.” In “The Hornswoggle Problem,” Patricia Churchland rejects the characterization of consciousness as a uniquely hard problem, and asserts her belief that arguing the unknown nature of consciousness, absent any scientific evidence is an argument from ignorance. A proponent of the “hard problem” would instead argue that consciousness possesses a subjective aspect that makes it uniquely different from all other problems. In this paper, it is my contention that Churchland is correct to reject the ‘hard’ problem argument; and without any objective inquiry or research, this “hard problem” argument lacks needed intellectual vigor, and tends to further
Armstrong begins his paper with a question for the reader of what it means to have a mind. It is well understood that man has the ability to perceive, to think, to feel, and so on, but what does it mean to perceive, to think, and to feel? The answer, he believes, lies in science. Seeing that science is constantly and rapidly gaining ground, he asserts that “...we can give a complete account of man in purely physico-chemical terms” (295?) Pointing out the fact that this view has been accepted by various scientists throughout time, he explains it is the most reliable way to approach the mind-body problem.
For centuries philosophers have engaged themselves into conversations and arguments trying to figure out the nature of a human person; this has lead to various theories and speculation about the nature of the human mind and body. The question they are tying to answer is whether a human being is made of only the physical, body and brain, or both the physical or the mental, mind. In this paper I will focus on the mind-body Identity Theory to illustrate that it provides a suitable explanation for the mind and body interaction.
There is a debate between scientists whether vampire bats should be killed or not. Firstly, ranchers, believe that vampire bats should be killed. For example, Chris Kraul a writer for the Los Angeles Times, shares that bats are feasting and killing off the cattle. Thus, this point proves that bats should be killed(Kraul). Secondly, Researchers believe that bats should be saved. For instance, Kraul reports that the theory for all of the attacks on the livestock are cause by timber cutting so the bats are losing food rich forests so they head toward the cattle for food. Therefore, this confirms that it is our fault for the bats attacking the livestock. Thirdly, I believe that bats should not be killed. To illustrate, Kraul tells bat based research
What’s a bat and star combined that lives underwater? The answer is bat star! Bat star, or ‘asterina miniata’ (scientific name) is a marvelous invertebrate. Its scientific name was way too complicated to comprehend, but bat star had another name called ‘patiria miniata’, which meant vermilion dish (scarlet dish). In this animal report, I will be presenting animal anatomy and appearance (bat star’s physical characteristics), classification (what kind of invertebrate bat star is, how I know it, etc.), habitat (where bat star lives) and diet (what bat star eats and other information about bat star’s food).
Last May the Boston Red Sox and the New York Yankees where tied 6-6 in the seventh inning. Christian Vasquez, who was known more as defensive player, and not a hitter. The pitcher throws the ball and Christian swings. It's a home run. His hit won the game. He was the hero of the day to his teammates, and his fans.
In David M. Armstrong’s “The Nature of Mind”, Armstrong praises the field of science and seeks to put the concept of mind into terms that agree with science’s definition of minds. His interest is in the physico-chemical, materialist view of man. Armstrong considers science to be the authority over other disciplines because of its reliability and result in consensus over disputed questions.
Thesis: The mind-body problem arises because of the lack of evidence when looking for a specific explanation of the interaction of mental and physical states, and the origin and even existence of them.
There is a human organism located exactly where you are located. Eric Olson argues that you are identical to that organism. This view is known as animalism. His “thinking animal” argument takes the following form: (1) There is a human animal where you are located; (2) If there’s a human animal where you are located, it is thinking; (3) The only thing thinking where you are located is you; and (4) So, you are a human animal. One argument, which exhibits parallel reasoning and boasts premises motivated in the exact same way, may be employed to resist Olson’s argument. In this paper I will show that this argument, which I will now call the Guanilo-Style argument, is structurally
The Knowledge Argument by Jackson is one of the main threats to Physicalism. Physicalism says that everything that is or could ever exist is ultimately physical in nature. The Knowledge Argument claims that there are truths about consciousness that cannot be deduced from the complete physical truth. Lewis’ response on the other hand, disagrees with the Knowledge Argument. In this paper I will address the Knowledge Argument and Lewis’ response to it.
The mind is perhaps the most fascinating part of the human body due to its complexity and ability to rationalize. In essence, the mind-body problem studies the relation of the mind to the body, and states that each human being seems to embody two unique and somewhat contradictory natures. Each human contains both a nature of matter and physicality, just like any other object that contains atoms in the universe. However, mankind also is constituted of something beyond materialism, which includes its ability to rationalize and be self-aware. This would imply that mankind is not simply another member of the world of matter because some of its most distinctive features cannot be accounted for in this manner. There are obvious differences between physical and mental properties. Physical properties are publically accessible, and have weight, texture, and are made of matter. Mental properties are not publically accessible, and have phenomenological texture and intentionality (Stewart, Blocker, Petrik, 2013). This is challenging to philosophers, because man cannot be categorized as a material or immaterial object, but rather a combination of both mind and body (Stewart, Blocker, Petrik, 2013). Man embodies mind-body dualism, meaning he is a blend of both mind and matter (Stewart, Blocker, Petrick, 2013). The mind-body problem creates conflict among philosophers, especially when analyzing physicalism in its defense. This paper outlines sound