1. Ben and Jerry are two partners-in-crime, who have robbed a bank. Ben got caught and is questioned by the police. He has got three options: to stay silent, confess, or tell the police that it was Jerry. Jerry can either remain at home, go to the police and blame Ben, or kill Ben's dog and cat. Ben feels good about confessing if Jerry does not do anything against him and feels good going to the police otherwise. Jerry on the other hand would hate to kill Ben's dog and cat, but would indulge in the revenge if Ben went to the police. For Jerry it is bad if Ben goes to the police. Ben is the row player and Jerry is the column player. Jerry Home Police Kill Ben Silent (3,4) (-4,5) (-5,3) Confess (-2,5) (-3, 6) (-7,-5) Police (-3,-7) (-1,-6) (-4,-2) Find the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies when a. Ben and Jerry move at the same time, not knowing what the other does. b. Ben moves first, then Jerry can observe this and subsequently makes his choice. c. Jerry moves first, then Ben can observe this and subsequently makes his choice.

1. Ben and Jerry are two partners-in-crime, who have robbed a bank. Ben got caught and is questioned by the police. He has got three options: to stay silent, confess, or tell the police that it was Jerry. Jerry can either remain at home, go to the police and blame Ben, or kill Ben's dog and cat. Ben feels good about confessing if Jerry does not do anything against him and feels good going to the police otherwise. Jerry on the other hand would hate to kill Ben's dog and cat, but would indulge in the revenge if Ben went to the police. For Jerry it is bad if Ben goes to the police. Ben is the row player and Jerry is the column player. Jerry Home Police Kill Ben Silent (3,4) (-4,5) (-5,3) Confess (-2,5) (-3, 6) (-7,-5) Police (-3,-7) (-1,-6) (-4,-2) Find the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies when a. Ben and Jerry move at the same time, not knowing what the other does. b. Ben moves first, then Jerry can observe this and subsequently makes his choice. c. Jerry moves first, then Ben can observe this and subsequently makes his choice.

Principles of Economics, 7th Edition (MindTap Course List)

7th Edition

ISBN:9781285165875

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter22: Frontiers Of Microeconomics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 6PA

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