1. Suppose a worker can survive by daily consumption of $40 value of commodities as determined by the socially necessary labor time of 4 hours. If a capitalist hires this worker to work for him 8 hours a day, how much will the capitalist be paying him within the Marxian framework? a) $20. b) $40. c) $160. d) Not enough information is available to calculate the paid wages.

1. Suppose a worker can survive by daily consumption of $40 value of commodities as determined by the socially necessary labor time of 4 hours. If a capitalist hires this worker to work for him 8 hours a day, how much will the capitalist be paying him within the Marxian framework? a) $20. b) $40. c) $160. d) Not enough information is available to calculate the paid wages.

MACROECONOMICS FOR TODAY

10th Edition

ISBN:9781337613057

Author:Tucker

Publisher:Tucker

Chapter1: Introducing The Economic Way Of Thinking

Section1.6: Why Do Economists Disagree?

Problem 2.1YTE

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