1. The following two examples show that truthful bidding is not a dominant strategy in the first- price and third-price auctions: a. Consider a first-price auction (The highest bidder wins the good, pays his or her bid; the other bidders do not pay). Suppose there are two bidders; bidder 1 has a value of 10. Argue that bidding 10 is not a best response for bidder 1 if bidder 2 bids 5. b. Consider a third-price auction (The highest bidder wins the good, pays the third highest bid; the other bidders do not pay). Suppose there are three bidders; bidder 1 has a value of 10. Argue that bidding 10 is not a best response for bidder 1 if bidder 2 bids 11 and bidder 3 bids 8.

Microeconomic Theory
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Author:NICHOLSON
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Chapter8: Game Theory
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 8.6P
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1. The following two examples show that truthful bidding is not a dominant strategy in the first-
price and third-price auctions:
a. Consider a first-price auction (The highest bidder wins the good, pays his or her bid; the
other bidders do not pay). Suppose there are two bidders; bidder 1 has a value of 10.
Argue that bidding 10 is not a best response for bidder 1 if bidder 2 bids 5.
b. Consider a third-price auction (The highest bidder wins the good, pays the third highest
bid; the other bidders do not pay). Suppose there are three bidders; bidder 1 has a
value of 10. Argue that bidding 10 is not a best response for bidder 1 if bidder 2 bids 11
and bidder 3 bids 8.
Transcribed Image Text:1. The following two examples show that truthful bidding is not a dominant strategy in the first- price and third-price auctions: a. Consider a first-price auction (The highest bidder wins the good, pays his or her bid; the other bidders do not pay). Suppose there are two bidders; bidder 1 has a value of 10. Argue that bidding 10 is not a best response for bidder 1 if bidder 2 bids 5. b. Consider a third-price auction (The highest bidder wins the good, pays the third highest bid; the other bidders do not pay). Suppose there are three bidders; bidder 1 has a value of 10. Argue that bidding 10 is not a best response for bidder 1 if bidder 2 bids 11 and bidder 3 bids 8.
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