1. We have a population of 3, they have the following benefit curves (TB): TB¹ = 3q - 2q² TB² = 2q - 5q² TB³ = 5q-q² And the Total Cost of the public good is: 5q² Derive the Samuelson condition for this society. What is Person 3's individual preference and what is the societal optimal given the Samuelson rule, can you explain why one is greater than/less than the other?

1. We have a population of 3, they have the following benefit curves (TB): TB¹ = 3q - 2q² TB² = 2q - 5q² TB³ = 5q-q² And the Total Cost of the public good is: 5q² Derive the Samuelson condition for this society. What is Person 3's individual preference and what is the societal optimal given the Samuelson rule, can you explain why one is greater than/less than the other?

Essentials of Economics (MindTap Course List)

8th Edition

ISBN:9781337091992

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter11: Public Goods And Common Resources

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 10PA

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