A2. 2- Consider two fishers John (J) and Amanda (A) are both fishing at a public lake. Let us use the followingnotation:V; = number of fish caught by i = J, A over some given period.e; = amount of time that i = J, A spend fishing, measured in fraction of the time period (effort level).Tj = the net payoff of fisher i= J, A.Let's assume that n¡ = yi -, where ya = 10(1 – 0.1e,)ea and y, = 10(1 – 0.1e4)ej.Note that the%3D%3Dterm4 denote the cost of effort. Assume the reservation payoff for fishers are nf, T.Find the Nash equilibrium effort level.What is the efficient effort level?I.II.

Nash equilibrium effort level will be achieved at the point where any of the two fishers optimize…

2- Consider two fishers John (J) and Amanda (A) are both fishing at a public lake. Let us use the following notation: Yi = number of fish caught by i = J, A over some given period. ej = amount of time that i = J, A spend fishing, measured in fraction of the time period (effort level). THj = the net payoff of fisher i= J, A. Let's assume that n¡ = Yi -, where ya = 10(1 – 0.1e,)e, and y, = 10(1 – 0.1e,)e,.Note that the

2- Consider two fishers John (J) and Amanda (A) are both fishing at a public lake. Let us use the following notation: Yi = number of fish caught by i = J, A over some given period. ej = amount of time that i = J, A spend fishing, measured in fraction of the time period (effort level). THj = the net payoff of fisher i= J, A. Let's assume that n¡ = Yi -, where ya = 10(1 – 0.1e,)e, and y, = 10(1 – 0.1e,)e,.Note that the

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter13: General Equilibrium And Welfare

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 13.12P

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