Pls help with below homework. 2) True or false? Explain your reasoninga. Log-liners learning converges to a pure strategy equilibriumb. Saddle point aq. Only occurs in zero-sum games,c. Fictitious play converges to the best nash equilibrium for all agentsd. PoA is identical to PoS if there exists only one pure Nash equilibriume. Cournot learning method can be stuck in iterating between non-equilibriumpoints. If true, give an example IF false, prove that it cannot be stuck in non-equilibrium pointsf. Log-liners learning can be applied to only zero sum games

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Answered: 2) True or false? Explain your…

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2) True or false? Explain your reasoning a. Log-liners learning converges to a pure strategy equilibrium

Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)

8th Edition

ISBN:9781305585126

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter17: Oligopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 5CQQ

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Question

Pls help with below homework.

2) True or false? Explain your reasoning
a. Log-liners learning converges to a pure strategy equilibrium
b. Saddle point aq. Only occurs in zero-sum games,
c. Fictitious play converges to the best nash equilibrium for all agents
d. PoA is identical to PoS if there exists only one pure Nash equilibrium
e. Cournot learning method can be stuck in iterating between non-equilibrium
points. If true, give an example IF false, prove that it cannot be stuck in non-
equilibrium points
f. Log-liners learning can be applied to only zero sum games

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