2. Suppose that there are 1,000 voters in your city. A total of 400 are willing to pay up to $25 each for the construction of a park, and the other 600 are willing to pay only $10. The construction of the park will cost $12,000. Someone proposes a vote on whether to tax each citizen $12 in order to finance the park. (a) What will be the result according to the median voter model? Is this result socially efficient? Explain. (b) What if instead of being willing to pay up to $25 each, the 400 residents were willing to pay up to $50 each?

2. Suppose that there are 1,000 voters in your city. A total of 400 are willing to pay up to $25 each for the construction of a park, and the other 600 are willing to pay only $10. The construction of the park will cost $12,000. Someone proposes a vote on whether to tax each citizen $12 in order to finance the park. (a) What will be the result according to the median voter model? Is this result socially efficient? Explain. (b) What if instead of being willing to pay up to $25 each, the 400 residents were willing to pay up to $50 each?

Principles of Economics 2e

2nd Edition

ISBN:9781947172364

Author:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Publisher:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Chapter18: Public Economy

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7SCQ: Suppose there is an election for Soft Drink Commissioner. The field consists of one candidate hunt...

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

What are some possible ways to encourage voter participation and overcome rational ignorance?
Suppose there is an election for Soft Drink Commissioner. The field consists of one candidate hunt the Pepsi petty and four from the Coca-Cola party. This would seem to indicate a strong preference for Coca-Cola among the voting population, but the Pepsi candidate ends up winning in a landslide. Why does this happen?
How does rational ignorance discourage voting?
2.9. The following informal descriptions of voting methods do not represent social choice functions as we have defined them. Explain why not.(a) (Mini-quota) Any candidate with at least 25% of the votes is declareda winner.(b) (Approval voting) Every voter answers a yes-or-no question abouteach candidate: “Is she acceptable?” Whichever candidate is acceptable to the most voters is declared the winner.(c) (Copeland without ties) The winners of the Copeland method become our finalists. If there is more than one finalist, the tie is resolvedby drawing straws.(d) (Condorcet candidate) Pick the candidate who defeats each of theother candidates in a head-to-head election
4.1. The vote-for-two method works as follows: Candidates get apoint whenever a voter ranks them first or second. The candidate withthe most points is declared to be the winner (or if several candidates tiefor the most points, they are all declared to be winners).(a) Does the vote-for-two method satisfy the Condorcet criterion?(b) Does the vote-for-two method satisfy the anti-Condorcet criterion?(c) Does the vote-for-two method satisfy the Pareto property?(d) Is the vote-for-two method independent?
4.12. A social choice function satisfies the bottom criterion if, whenever a candidate is not at the bottom of the preference list of any voter,that candidate is a winner.(a) Does the plurality method satisfy the bottom criterion?(b) Does the antiplurality method satisfy the bottom criterion?(c) Explain why it is impossible for a social choice function with three ormore candidates to satisfy both the bottom criterion and the Paretocriterion.
4.10. A social choice function satisfies the weak Pareto criterion if,whenever every voter places one candidate above another, say rankingcandidate A over candidate B, then candidate B cannot be the uniquewinner. (This differs from the Pareto property owing to the words “theunique”.)(a) Explain why any method that satisfies Pareto also satisfies weakPareto.(b) Explain why the antiplurality method satisfies weak Pareto.(c) Explain why the agenda method violates weak Pareto.
1.14. Consider a variation on the idea of a weighted voting system, inwhich one or more voters is given a negative weight. Show that sucha system is not monotone. If a voter knows that the method assigns anegative weight to her vote, how will she be inclined to cast her ballot?
Please no written by hand "No voting system is perfect." What does it mean by economist K. Arrow? Give a brief account on Condorcet Voting Paradox. A public school district is voting on the school budget and the resulting student-teacher ratio. A poll finds that 20 percent of the voters want a ratio of 9:1, 25 percent want a ratio of 10:1, 15 percent want a ratio of 11:1, and 40 percent want a ratio of 12:1. What outcome would you expect the district to
There are three individuals in a community: 1,2 and 3. Their valuations of the public good, G, are MB1=40-2G , MB2=20-G and MB3=10-G/2 . Let MCG=ACG= 12 a )Suppose the individuals must vote to determine the level of G, assuming that person 3 pays all of the cost. What will G be, according to the median voter theorem? Show your work b). Quantify the magnitude of the inefficiency caused by voting in part (a) That is, calculate the net loss of total social surplus that occurs because of the G you found in (a)
1.17. Jones and Smith are running for public office. There are 99 voters.(a) Suppose the rules say that Jones wins if she receives 50 or morevotes; otherwise Smith wins. Is this method neutral?(b) Suppose the rules say that a candidate wins if he or she receivesa number of votes that is between 60 and 89. (If neither candidategets a winning number of votes, then the election is a tie.) Is thismethod monotone?(c) Suppose the rules say that a candidate wins if he or she receives anodd number of votes. (If neither candidate gets a winning numberof votes, then the election is a tie.) Is this method decisive?(d) Suppose that the rules say that Smith wins the election no matterwhat. Is this method anonymous?
2) What is straight-ticket voting? How does this help candidates in down ballot races?