3. Consider a simple two-firm case. Suppose both firms produce the same good, but at different marginal costs (with one firm at a lower marginal cost than the other). In this type of situation, compare and contrast the market price, profit, and total output berween Cournot and Stackelberg models Separately consider when 0 the cost-efficient firm is the first-mover vs when (i) the cost-inefficient firm is the first-mover in the Stackelberg model.
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- 1 Consider two identical firms with a unit cost of production of $10 and a market demand of p= 60-y. (a) What is firm 1’s optimal output level as a function of firm 2’s output? (b) What is firm 2’s optimal output level as a function of firm 1’s output? (c) What is the Cournot equilibrium output level for these firms? (d) What is the Cournot equilibrium price level? Show your work step by step.A homogeneous products duopoly faces a market demand function given by Q = 20-2P, where Q = Q1 + Q2. Both firms have a constant marginal cost MC = 4. 1. Suppose the two firms set their quantities simultaneously by guessing the other firm's quantity choice. Derive the equation of each firm's reaction curve and then graph these curves. 2. What is the Cournot equilibrium quantity and price in this market for each firm? 3. What would the equilibrium price in this market be if it were perfectly competitive? 4. What is the Bertrand equilibrium price in this market?4. Two Stackelberg-competitors with no costs face the common market demand curve P=30−Q, where Q is the combined output of both firms. Firm 1, the leader, picks its output first. Then Firm 2, the follower, picks its output. How much output does Firm 2 produce in their sequential-move game? a) 3 units. b) 15 units. c) 15/2 units. d) 30 units.
- If firm 1 and firm 2 are the oligopolistic firms in bottled spring water production in Nomansland. The market demand is given by ? = 5000 −20?, Qd is the number of kilolitres demanded per month while P is the price of kilolitres of bottled water. The marginal cost of a kilolitre of bottled water is R10.How do I Find the Cournot equilibrium quantities and price? and how do I Find the Cournot profits and the monopolist profits?Suppose two Bertrand competitors, F1 and F2, make identical products for a market with inverse demand P = 600 – 0.5Q. Both firms have the same costs Ci = 20qi, and each firm has sufficient capacity to supply the entire market. a. What prices will the firms choose? How much might each produce and what profit would they make? Is the result a Nash equilibrium? Explain. b. Suppose F1 improves its efficiency, reducing its cost to C1 = 16q1. What will happen in this market? Explain. c. Assume now that the firms have their original identical costs, but that F1 has only 100 units of capacity and F2 has only 200 units of capacity. What prices will the firms choose now? Explain why neither firm will want to decrease its price at the equilibrium you identify. Why would neither firm want to increase its price? Prove this for F1.Suppose that there are two firms producing a homogenous product and let the market demand besiven by Q(P) = 120 -P/2 . For simplicity assume that each fir operates with zero total cost. a) Assuming that firms compete over quantities, find the price best-response functions of firms 1 and2. Draw a diagram that shows the BRFs and the equilibrium, Are outputs strategic substitutes orcomplements? Find each firm's Cournot equilibrium output, price, profit, and total surplus. DefineNash equilibrium and argue that it is indeed a Nash equilibrium. b) Show that the duopolists have incentives to collude, Find their joint profit-maximizing price, output,and profit: find each firm's output and profit. Is collusion a Nash equilibrium? If not, what is theoptimal defection for each firm? Show this game in a 2X2 matrix form. What does this imply aboutthe Nash equilibrium or the stability of their collusive agreement? Is it a Prisoner's Dilemma Type? c) Suppose now that fims play the above game in…
- Three firms compete in the style of Cournot. All firms have a constant returns to scale technology: There are no fixed cost and each firm's marginal cost is constant. The market demand is given by Q(P) = 9 - P. Firm 1's marginal cost is MC1 = 1, firm 2's marginal cost is MC2 = 2. Let MC3 be the marginal cost of Firm 3. Which of the below is a necessary condition so that q > 0 for all three firms in a Nash equilibrium? a. MC3 < 1 b. MC3 < 4 c. MC3 < 3 d. MC3 > 1 e. MC3 < 2consider a market with inverse demand P(Q) = 10 − Q and two firms with cost curves C1(q1) = 2q1 and C2(q2) = 2q2 (that is, they have the same marginal costs and no fixed costs). They compete by choosing quantities. Suppose that Firm 1 chooses quantity first and is able to credibly commit to this choice. Then firm 2 choose its quantity after observing firm 1’s quantity. In the SPNE of this game, what is the price faced by consumers?- p = 3- p = 4- p = 5- p = 6- p = 7Suppose that an oligopolistic is charging $21 per unit of output and selling 31 units each day. What is its daily total revenue? Also suppose that previously it had lowered its price from $21 to $19, rivals matched the price cut, and the firmâs sales increased from 31 to 32 units. It also previously raised its price from $21 to $23, rivals ignored the price hike, and the firmâs daily total revenue came in at $482. Which of the following is most logical to conclude? The firmâs demand curve is (a) inelastic over the $21 to $23 price range, (b) elastic over the $19 to $21 price range, (c) a linear(straight) down sloping line, or (d) a curve with a kink in it?
- 1. Suppose that market demand is given by ? = 120 − ?/3. The two identical firms in the market both have marginal costs of 20. Draw the reaction curves on a graph and find the Cournot equilibrium quantities and price.Two firms with differentiated products are competing in price. Firm A and B face thefollowing demand curves: Q_A = 70 − 2P_A + P_B and Q_B = 120 − 2P_B + P_Arespectively. Assume production is costless.a. Give equations for and graph each firm’s reaction curve.b. If both firms set their prices at the same time, what is the Nash equilibriumprice, quantity, and profit for each firm?c. Suppose A sets its price first and then B responds. What price and quantitydoes each firm set now? Is it advantageous to move first?d. Compare the profits from part b and c. Which firm benefits more from thesequential price choosing? (Please do b-d, thanks :))2. Consider a two-firms Cournot model with constant returns to scale. Assume also that the inverse demand function is P = 100 – 2Q, with marginal cost equal to 20for both firms, where Q = q1 + q2 . a) Derive the Nash equilibrium of this model and compare it with Monopoly and Perfect competition.