33 (b) (c) (d) (e) functions. negative them. Find the best response function of each partner. Draw the best response Solve for the Nash equilibrium of this game. 1 Now assume that b = -. (This implies that the effort levels have synergies.) Solve for the best response functions in this case and draw Solve for the Nash equilibrium of this game. Now suppose that the partners can write a contract on effort levels. That is, they can determine the effort levels which would maximize the firm's revenue net of total effort costs. Briefly explain whether you would expect the effort levels they choose to specify in the contract to be higher or lower than the effort levels you found in parts (b) and (d).

33 (b) (c) (d) (e) functions. negative them. Find the best response function of each partner. Draw the best response Solve for the Nash equilibrium of this game. 1 Now assume that b = -. (This implies that the effort levels have synergies.) Solve for the best response functions in this case and draw Solve for the Nash equilibrium of this game. Now suppose that the partners can write a contract on effort levels. That is, they can determine the effort levels which would maximize the firm's revenue net of total effort costs. Briefly explain whether you would expect the effort levels they choose to specify in the contract to be higher or lower than the effort levels you found in parts (b) and (d).

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter20: The Problem Of Adverse Selection Moral Hazard

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 3MC

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

Jiffy-Pol Consultants is paid $1,000,000 for each percentage of the vote that Senator Sleaze receives in the upcoming election. Sleaze’s share of the vote is determined by the number of slanderous campaign ads run by Jiffy-Pol according to the function S = 100N/(N + 1), where N is the number of ads. If each ad costs $4,900 approximately how many ads should Jiffy-Pol buy in order to maximize its profits? A) 2,853. B) 1428. C)98 D) 477.
The marginal benefit of being able to emit a ton of sulfur dioxide emissions for two firms are given by:MBX = 1000 – ( Ex / 2 )MBY = 600 – ( Ey / 3 ) Note that these marginal benefit figures can be interpreted as marginal cost of abating emission down to levels Ex and Ey.Government regulators want to reduce total sulfur dioxide emissions to a total of 1800 tons.a) If the government imposes the same standard of 900 tons maximum emissions on both firms what would be the total cost of abatement (calculated as the aggregated marginal benefits forgone)? b) If the government distributed 900 tradable pollution permits (one ton each) to each firm what would be the final allocation of these permits after the firms trade them?c) What would be the total cost of abatement in this latter case?
Suppose the Carrow Road stadium has a capacity of 50,000 seats and is used for sevengames a year. Three are Premiership games, with a demand for tickets (expressed in thousands)given by D = 150 − 3p per game, where p is the ticket price. Three of the other games are EastAnglia friendly matches with demand D = 90 − 3p per game. Finally, one is a Champion’s Leaguegame with a demand D = 240 − 3p. The costs of operating the stadium are independent of thenumber of tickets sold.(a) Determine the optimal ticket price for each game, assuming the objective is profit maximization.(b) Given that the stadium is frequently full, the idea of expanding the stadium has arisen. Apreliminary study suggests that the cost of capacity expansion would be £100 per seat per year.Would you recommend that the football club goes ahead with the project of capacity expansion?
C2) Company A is the only supplier of glass in Big Apple City used for tall buildings’ exteriors. Its marginal cost of production is cA=1, and it has no other production costs. The demand for such glass in Big Apple city is QD=2-P. Company B in Jersey City produces the same glass and is considering whether to expand to Big Apple city. If it enters, it needs to get a permit to allow it to be a supplier in the Big-Apple city at a cost of L=0.5, which does not vary with quantity of output, and its marginal cost of production is cB=0.5. If it expands to the Big-Apple city, companies A and B both supply to the market, and the market price P satisfies QA+QB=2-P, where QA is company A’s production level and QB is company B’s. a) If company B expands to the Big-Apple city, what is the resulting price in a Nash equilibrium? b) Company B hires a consulting company to advise whether it should expand to the Big-Apple city. If you’re running the consulting company, what is your advice? Explain…
C2) Company A is the only supplier of glass in Big Apple City used for tall buildings’ exteriors. Its marginal cost of production is cA=1, and it has no other production costs. The demand for such glass in Big Apple city is QD=2-P. Company B in Jersey City produces the same glass and is considering whether to expand to Big Apple city. If it enters, it needs to get a permit to allow it to be a supplier in the Big-Apple city at a cost of L=0.5, which does not vary with quantity of output, and its marginal cost of production is cB=0.5. If it expands to the Big-Apple city, companies A and B both supply to the market, and the market price P satisfies QA+QB=2-P, where QA is company A’s production level and QB is company B’s. a) If company B expands to the Big-Apple city, what is the resulting price in a Nash equilibrium? b) Company B hires a consulting company to advise whether it should expand to the Big-Apple city. If you’re running the consulting company, what is your advice? Explain…
True/False/Uncertain Suppose there is a reallocation from state R to state Q. The Scitovsky paradox of: “Q is socially desirable to R (there is a Pareto improvement of reallocation from R to Q) and simultaneously reallocation of Q to R is also a Pareto improvement” can be avoided (i.e. we can unambiguously state that Q is preferred to R) if the gainers of the movement from R to Q could compensate the losers and still remain better off and the losers cannot bribe the gainers to forego the reallocation from R to Q.
Suppose that there is a civil case against a defendant. The probability of the plaintiff winning is fixed at p=0. 5. The damages ar e given by V(Cp ,Cd)=6+6 ln(Cp +1)−6 ln(Cd +1). Find the optimal legal expenditur es under an English-style legal fee system. For what amount would the defendant agree to settle?
1) Maximize following equation: w (x,y,) =-3x2+30x-6y2 Subject to x+y=5 2) Find dP/dQ P=5Q+Q2 3) π=-Q2+17Q-60 Find Q that maximizes the function 4) Find dk/dπ and dl/dπ π= 100kl - 5k2 l2+ 2k+ 4l
S Pte Ltd (“SPL”) is a country incorporated and tax resident in Country S. It has developed a social audio platform whereby the users can connect with other users from different parts of the world via audio chat. SPL believes that social audio feature will be the next game changer in the internet space, especially when a lot of countries are still in lock-down mode and human-to-human connection becomes a huge concern during Pandemic.The social audio platform is getting more popular in Asia and SPL is keen to explore the possibility of setting up a Headquarter company in Singapore with operating subsidiaries in Malaysia, Thailand, Japan and Hong Kong. Required: Assuming SPL is interested in applying for tax incentives in Singapore, illustrate the two (2) relevant tax incentives SPL can consider based on the information stated above, and discuss any additional conditions SPL should be aware of.
This is a two-player, simultaneous one-move game represented as a game table (normal form).a) What is the pure strategy Nash equilibrium outcome if there is one? b) Is this a socially optimal outcome? If not, which outcome is preferred? c) Do all three solution approaches for simultaneous games work independently (not together)? If not, which do not? d) Draw the game as a game tree (extensive form). e) Switch the payoffs in cells (A, A) and (D, D). What is the pure strategy Nash equilibrium outcome if there is one?
Yummy Yummy Popcorn, Inc. sells bags of flavored popcorn in a popular mall. As shop owner and operator, you have observed that weekly popcorn sales are well-described by the demand equation: Q = 1,200 - 800P + 2.0A, where A denotes advertising weekly spending (in dollars). You are currently charging $1.50 per bag of popcorn (for which the marginal cost is $.75) and spending $500 per week on advertising. b) Check whether your current $1.50 price is profit maximizing. If not, determine the store’s optimal quantity and price. c) Should the store consider increasing its advertising spending? Why or why not. Please do fast ASAP fast
Consider a random-relocation economy where each young person receives 10 units of the consumption good. There are 100 young people born each period. The total stock of money is constant and equal to $500. The consumption good can be transformed, one to one, into capital, which will give a return of x > 1 next period. Suppose a personís preferences are such that they want to consume 1/2 of their endowment when young 2 of ECON20532 and 1/2 when old. They all dislike risk. We also assume that the probability that a person is relocated is 10% (known to everybody) and the gross return on capital is 1.1. A person is notifed whether she needs to relocate or not at the end of period 1. A person who relocates can take with her money, but not capital. Individual agents cannot invest directly in capital, but there exists a (perfectly competitive) banking sector that accepts deposits from all young people. (a) What is the state contingent rate of return o§ered by banks on deposits? (b) Write…