Please answer the correct please ASAP explain please. 5 6 7 8 Don't answer by pen paper please answer ASAP 5.ACACACWhere a group of potential attendees at an event is made up of one group whoall want high attendance and another who prefer low attendance,the only equilibrium possible is zeroattendance.6.If potential workers are either high-ability or low ability and firms cannot tell themapart then risk-neutral firms will be willing to payAattendance will be stable at 50%.Cthe weighted average of the high-ability and low-ability wages.a wage that cannot be determined inadvance.BBThe difference between the high-ability wage and the average wageis less than the cost of the degree.D7.If obtaining a degree is a signal of high ability and will attract a higher wage, thena separating equilibrium in which high-ability agents will pay for the degree willoccur when which of the following are true?optimal signalling.Dunproductive signalling.The high-ability wage is greater thanthe cost of the degree.DBequilibrium outcomes may or maynot exist, or might be unstableand/or oscillating.full attendance will be the long-runequilibrium.8.If obtaining degrees is costly in terms of social resources and does not improveproductivity but only redistributes income to high-ability workers, then it is anexample ofBthe wage consistent with high-abilityproductivity.the lowest wage possible.The difference between the high-ability and low-ability wagesexceeds the cost of the degree.All workers are high-ability.a pooling equilibrium.D labour market equilibrium.

Signaling:Signaling refers to actions or characteristics that convey information about an…

5. A C Where a group of potential attendees at an event is made up of one group who all want high attendance and another who prefer low attendance, the only equilibrium possible is zero attendance. attendance will be stable at 50%. B D equilibrium outcomes may or may not exist, or might be unstable and/or oscillating. full attendance will be the long-run equilibrium.

5. A C Where a group of potential attendees at an event is made up of one group who all want high attendance and another who prefer low attendance, the only equilibrium possible is zero attendance. attendance will be stable at 50%. B D equilibrium outcomes may or may not exist, or might be unstable and/or oscillating. full attendance will be the long-run equilibrium.

Exploring Economics

8th Edition

ISBN:9781544336329

Author:Robert L. Sexton

Publisher:Robert L. Sexton

Chapter8: Market Failure

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 9P

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

Why is there asymmetric information in the labor market? What signals can an employer look for that might indicate file traits they are seeking in a new employee?
Assume the city of Norman is currently comprised of high productivity workers (MPHP = 80) andlow productivity workers (MPLP = 25). You estimate that 30% are high productivity.(a) Let’s assume every firm had perfect information. If that was the case, what is the market wage?(b) In reality, there is always some asymmetric information. In this case, what would be the marketwage?(c) Now, let’s assume the firm is willing to offer a wage of $80 to anyone with ̄e years of education.Let’s assume the cost for a high productivity work is $5 per year, and the cost for a lowproductivity worker is $11 per year. For what levels of ̄e will each type go to college?(d) What is the separating equilibrium?(e) Now, let’s assume you were wrong about the number of high productivity workers. In reality,50% are considered high productivity workers. How does this impact your answers? Is eachgroup more or less likely to go to college now? Explain.(f) What about if the community actually contained 80% high…
assume there are two types of workers, low- and high-ability, andlet 0 = 0.25 be the proportion of high-ability workers in the population. Assume their marginalproductivity and, therefore, their wages are wh = $20 and wl = $16, and that both types canuse college education to signal high ability. The cost of college education for low-ability workersis cl = $5 whereas the cost for high-ability workers is ch = $2. Consider the wage for both types of workers and the high-ability workers’ college cost, ch. For which values of 0 (the proportion of high-ability workers in the population) do the high-ability workers prefer the separating equilibrium over the pooling equilibrium? (a) Any 0 > 1/2(b) Any 0 < 1/2 (c) Any 0 < 3/4(d) Only when 0 = 1
Give typing answer with explanation and conclusion 1. If wH=100 and wL=36 and U(w)=w^1/2. Further, let the reservation utility be 7. (a) What is the minimum probability for which the wage earner accepts the contract? (b)Let p=3/4. What is the maximum cost of effort for which the tenant accepts the contract?
Assume that the current Disability Insurance (DI) benefi t for those whoare unable to work is $X per day and that DI benefi ts go to zero if aworker accepts a job for even 1 hour per week. Suppose that the benefi trules are changed so those disabled workers who take jobs that pay lessthan $X per day receive a benefi t that brings their total daily income(earnings plus the DI benefi t) up to $X. As soon as their labor marketearnings rise above $X per day, their disability benefi ts end. Draw theold and new budget constraints (label each clearly) associated with theDI program, and analyze the work-incentive effects of the change inbenefi ts.
Please no written by hand Suppose all workers have the same preferences represented by U = (sqroot)w - 2x , where w is the wage and x is the proportion of the firm’s air that is composed of toxic pollutants. There are only two types of jobs in the economy, a clean job (x = 0) and a dirty job (x = 1). Let w0 be the wage paid by the clean job and w1 be the wage paid for doing the dirty job. If the clean job pays $16 per hour, what is the wage in dirty jobs? What is the compensating wage differential?
4. The following equation relates the natural log of wages, W, to risk, R, and a vector of covariates, X: lnW = bo +b1*R + C*X. lnW is the natural log of W. Assume that W = 30,000, b1 = 0.15 and the change in risk being considered is a 1 in 3,000 increase in the probability of death. Note also that dW/W = 0.15. A. What would an individual worker need to be paid to be willing to incur this 1 in 3,000 increased risk of death? B. What is the statistical value of a life, based upon this wage equation?
Question 2Consider the case of Jonathan, who is a singlefather with one child. He can work as a serverfor $6 per hour up to 1,500 hours per year. Heis eligible for welfare and can receivegovernment support of $10,000 for notworking at all. If he works 1,500 hours, hisearnings would be______ and governmentsupport would be______.O a) 2.000; 8,000O b) 3,000; 7,000O c) 9,000; 1,000O d) 10,000; 0
Use graph to illustrate the matching of employers and employees under hedonic wage theory with risk of injury. Assume there are two employees of different types (A and B), and two employers of two different types (X and Y). Worker A maximizes utility along A2 by working for Employer X for WAX and risk level RAX. Worker B maximizes utility along B2 by working for Employer Y for high wage WBY and with high risk level RBY Please draw the indifference curves and the iso-profit curves with zero profit, point out the two tangent points that measure the matching points for both employers and employees. (Hint: use Risk of Injury as the horizontal axis.)
(a) What is an Efficiency Wage? (b) Why is it Profitable for the Firm to pay an Efficiency Wage when Workers have better information about their Productivity than Firms do?
Consider a competitive economy that has four different jobs that vary by their wage and risk level. The table below describes each of the four jobs.Job Risk ( r ) Wage ( w)A 1/5 $ 3B 1/4 $12C 1/3 $23D 1/2 $25All workers are equally productive, but workers vary in their preferences. Consider a worker who values his wage and the risk level according to the following utility function:u(w, r) = w + 1/r2Where does the worker choose to work? Suppose the government regulated the workplace and required all jobs to have a risk factor of 1/5 (that is, all jobs must become A jobs). What wage would the worker now need to earn in the A job to be equally happy following the regulation?
There are 50 workers in the economy in which all workers must choose to work a safe or a risky job. When it comes to accepting a risky job, Worker 1’s reservation price is $5; worker 2’s reservation price is $6, worker 3's reservation wage is $7, and so on. Assume there are exactly 12 risky jobs. (a) What is the equilibrium wage differential between safe and risky jobs? Which workers will be employed at the risky firm? (b) Suppose now that an advertising campaign, paid for by the employers who offer risky jobs, stresses the excitement associated with “the thrill of injury,” and this campaign changes the attitudes of the work force toward being employed in a risky job. Worker 1 now has a reservation price of $1, worker 2’s reservation price is $2, and so on. There are still only 12 risky jobs. What is the new equilibrium wage differential? c) What is the maximum the firm should be willing to pay for its ad campaign?