5. Majority-rule benefit-cost analysis Jackson, Hope, Zachary, and Phoebe are college roommates. They're trying to decide where the four of them should go for spring break: Virginia Beach or Cancun. If they order the tickets by 10:00 PM on February 1, the cost will be just $500 per person. If they miss that deadline, the cost rises to $1,200 per person. The following table shows the benefit (in dollar terms) that each roommate would get from the two trips. Roommate Jackson Hope Zachary Phoebe Benefit from Virginia Beach Benefit from Cancun $1,300 $600 $850 $900 $1,100 $850 $700 $650 The roommates tend to put off making decisions. So, when February 1 rolls around and they still haven't made a decision, they schedule a vote for 9:00 PM that night. In case of a tie, they will flip a coin between the two vacation destinations. Cancun/Virginia Beach

5. Majority-rule benefit-cost analysis Jackson, Hope, Zachary, and Phoebe are college roommates. They're trying to decide where the four of them should go for spring break: Virginia Beach or Cancun. If they order the tickets by 10:00 PM on February 1, the cost will be just $500 per person. If they miss that deadline, the cost rises to $1,200 per person. The following table shows the benefit (in dollar terms) that each roommate would get from the two trips. Roommate Jackson Hope Zachary Phoebe Benefit from Virginia Beach Benefit from Cancun $1,300 $600 $850 $900 $1,100 $850 $700 $650 The roommates tend to put off making decisions. So, when February 1 rolls around and they still haven't made a decision, they schedule a vote for 9:00 PM that night. In case of a tie, they will flip a coin between the two vacation destinations. Cancun/Virginia Beach

Principles of Microeconomics

7th Edition

ISBN:9781305156050

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter22: Frontiers Of Microeconomics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7PA

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