5. Viewed from the economist's perspective, which of the following is cited as a reason why criminal law is a necessary complement to tort law, even when perfect compensation is possible? A. Any amount of the crime is economically inefficient punishment makes it easier to reduce the crime rate to 0. B. Because the probability of getting caught is usually less than one, punishment must be added to damages to achieve the economically efficient level of deterrence. C. Tort law can only be used to address unintentional negligence; it cannot be used to address intentional negligence. D. From an economic perspective the protection of interests is more important than the protection of rights.

5. Viewed from the economist's perspective, which of the following is cited as a reason why criminal law is a necessary complement to tort law, even when perfect compensation is possible? A. Any amount of the crime is economically inefficient punishment makes it easier to reduce the crime rate to 0. B. Because the probability of getting caught is usually less than one, punishment must be added to damages to achieve the economically efficient level of deterrence. C. Tort law can only be used to address unintentional negligence; it cannot be used to address intentional negligence. D. From an economic perspective the protection of interests is more important than the protection of rights.

Exploring Economics

8th Edition

ISBN:9781544336329

Author:Robert L. Sexton

Publisher:Robert L. Sexton

Chapter8: Market Failure

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 10P

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