7. In a vote between options A, B, and C, option C wins. When option B is eliminated and a vote is taken between option A and option C, option A wins. The voting system used fails to satisfy which of Arrow's properties of a desirable voting system? a. unanimity b. transitivity c. independence of irrelevant alternatives d. No dictators

7. In a vote between options A, B, and C, option C wins. When option B is eliminated and a vote is taken between option A and option C, option A wins. The voting system used fails to satisfy which of Arrow's properties of a desirable voting system? a. unanimity b. transitivity c. independence of irrelevant alternatives d. No dictators

Principles of Microeconomics

7th Edition

ISBN:9781305156050

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter22: Frontiers Of Microeconomics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 4CQQ

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Similar questions

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1.14. Consider a variation on the idea of a weighted voting system, inwhich one or more voters is given a negative weight. Show that sucha system is not monotone. If a voter knows that the method assigns anegative weight to her vote, how will she be inclined to cast her ballot?
4.1. The vote-for-two method works as follows: Candidates get apoint whenever a voter ranks them first or second. The candidate withthe most points is declared to be the winner (or if several candidates tiefor the most points, they are all declared to be winners).(a) Does the vote-for-two method satisfy the Condorcet criterion?(b) Does the vote-for-two method satisfy the anti-Condorcet criterion?(c) Does the vote-for-two method satisfy the Pareto property?(d) Is the vote-for-two method independent?
2.9. The following informal descriptions of voting methods do not represent social choice functions as we have defined them. Explain why not.(a) (Mini-quota) Any candidate with at least 25% of the votes is declareda winner.(b) (Approval voting) Every voter answers a yes-or-no question abouteach candidate: “Is she acceptable?” Whichever candidate is acceptable to the most voters is declared the winner.(c) (Copeland without ties) The winners of the Copeland method become our finalists. If there is more than one finalist, the tie is resolvedby drawing straws.(d) (Condorcet candidate) Pick the candidate who defeats each of theother candidates in a head-to-head election
1. A city has three equal-sized groups of people: (1) Type A people consistently prefer more public school expenditure; (2) Type B people prefer high levels of public school expenditure to low levels, and they prefer low levels to medium levels; (3) Type C people most prefer medium levels to low levels, and they prefer low levels to high levels. Will majority voting generate consistent outcomes in this case? (Hint: you should check if there are cycles in outcomes by changing the order of voting) A.True B. False 2. Suppose Florida government has asked you to design and evaluate the effectiveness of an education voucher program. What is wrong with simply comparing the educational performance of those receiving vouchers with those who do not receive vouchers? Explain.
4.10. A social choice function satisfies the weak Pareto criterion if,whenever every voter places one candidate above another, say rankingcandidate A over candidate B, then candidate B cannot be the uniquewinner. (This differs from the Pareto property owing to the words “theunique”.)(a) Explain why any method that satisfies Pareto also satisfies weakPareto.(b) Explain why the antiplurality method satisfies weak Pareto.(c) Explain why the agenda method violates weak Pareto.
Please no written by hand "No voting system is perfect." What does it mean by economist K. Arrow? Give a brief account on Condorcet Voting Paradox. A public school district is voting on the school budget and the resulting student-teacher ratio. A poll finds that 20 percent of the voters want a ratio of 9:1, 25 percent want a ratio of 10:1, 15 percent want a ratio of 11:1, and 40 percent want a ratio of 12:1. What outcome would you expect the district to