A decorator, who is a monopolist, makes two types of specialty picture frames. From experience, the decorator has determined that if x frames of the first type and y frames of the second type are made and put on sale in a showroom, they can be sold for (100 - 2x) dollars and (120 - 3y) dollars each, respectively. The total cost of constructing these frames is (12x + 12y + 4xy) dollars. How many frames of each type should be produced to realize the maximum profit. and what is the maximum profit? Make sure to verify that this is indeed a maximum

A decorator, who is a monopolist, makes two types of specialty picture frames. From experience, the decorator has determined that if x frames of the first type and y frames of the second type are made and put on sale in a showroom, they can be sold for (100 - 2x) dollars and (120 - 3y) dollars each, respectively. The total cost of constructing these frames is (12x + 12y + 4xy) dollars. How many frames of each type should be produced to realize the maximum profit. and what is the maximum profit? Make sure to verify that this is indeed a maximum

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter14: Monopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 14.9P

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As a manager of a chain of movie theaters that are monopolies in their respective markets, you have noticed much higher demand on weekends than during the week. You therefore conducted a study that has revealed two different demand curves at your movie theaters. On weekends, the inverse demand function is P = 20 - 0.001Q; on weekdays, it is P = 15 - 0.002Q. You acquire legal rights from movie producers to show their films at a cost of $25,000 per movie, plus a $2.50 "royalty" for each moviegoer entering your theaters (the average moviegoer in your market watches a movie only once). What price should you charge on weekends? What price should you charge on weekdays?
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As a manager of a chain of movie theaters that are monopolies in their respective markets, you have noticed much higher demand on weekends than during the week. You therefore conducted a study that has revealed two different demand curves at your movie theaters. On weekends, the inverse demand function is P = 20 − 0.001Q; on weekdays, it is P = 15 − 0.002Q. You acquire legal rights from movie producers to show their films at a cost of $25,000 per movie, plus a $2.50 “royalty” for each moviegoer entering your theaters (the average moviegoer in your market watches a movie only once). Devise a pricing strategy to maximize your firm’s profits.
As a manager of a chain of movie theaters that are monopolies in their respective markets, you have noticed much higher demand on weekends than during the week. You therefore conducted a study that has revealed two different demand curves at your movie theaters. On weekends, the inverse demand function is P = 20 – 0.001Q; on weekdays, it is P = 15 – 0.002Q. You acquire legal rights from movie producers to show their films at a cost of $25,000 per movie, plus a $2.50 “royalty” for each moviegoer entering your theaters (the average moviegoer in your market watches a movie only once).
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