Rich Uncle Pennybags is the only seller of board games in Atlantic City, New Jersey. The inverse demand curve for board games is given by: P= 40–0.5q where q is in hundreds of games per month. Rich Uncle Pennybags' marginal cost of producing board games is: MC =7+0.1q . Suppose Uncle Pennybags is a magnificent salesman, able to discern perfectly his customers' willingness to pay. If he leverages this information to begin perfectly price discriminating, how many board games will he sell?

Rich Uncle Pennybags is the only seller of board games in Atlantic City, New Jersey. The inverse demand curve for board games is given by: P= 40–0.5q where q is in hundreds of games per month. Rich Uncle Pennybags' marginal cost of producing board games is: MC =7+0.1q . Suppose Uncle Pennybags is a magnificent salesman, able to discern perfectly his customers' willingness to pay. If he leverages this information to begin perfectly price discriminating, how many board games will he sell?

Exploring Economics

8th Edition

ISBN:9781544336329

Author:Robert L. Sexton

Publisher:Robert L. Sexton

Chapter13: Monopoly And Antitrust

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 13P

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