A dominant or price setting firm and several smaller price takers serve a market where total market demand is Qd = 560-2P and the combined supply from all the smaller firms is Qs=-60+2P. Does this market meet the assumptions that the dominant firm has at least a market share of 50%? (you must motivate your answer numerically)

A dominant or price setting firm and several smaller price takers serve a market where total market demand is Qd = 560-2P and the combined supply from all the smaller firms is Qs=-60+2P. Does this market meet the assumptions that the dominant firm has at least a market share of 50%? (you must motivate your answer numerically)

Microeconomics

13th Edition

ISBN:9781337617406

Author:Roger A. Arnold

Publisher:Roger A. Arnold

Chapter11: Monopolistic Competition, Oligopoly, And Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 3WNG

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A dominant or price setting firm and several smaller price takers serve a market where total market demand is Qd = 560 – 2P and the combined supply from all the smaller firms is Qs = - 60 + 2P. State the demand (Qdf=) and inverse demand (Pdf=) function for the dominant firm (df).
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