Assume the market shares of the six largest firms in an industry are 15 percent each. The six-firm concentration ratio would indicate that the industry is highly concentrated, while the Herfindahl- Hirschman Index would not. True OR False?
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Assume the market shares of the six largest firms in an industry are 15 percent each. The six-firm concentration ratio would indicate that the industry is highly concentrated, while the Herfindahl- Hirschman Index would not.
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- Exercise 6.8. Two companies with cost functions C1 (q1 )=5q1 and C2 (q2)= 0.5 q2 ² supply the to the same market. If the inverse market demand function is given by P = 100 - 0,5Q , where Q = q₁ + q₂ , find a) The production level of each firm, the price and the profits if the companies compete according to the Cournot model. (b) The level of production of each undertaking, the price and the profits if the undertakings agree to jointly maximise their profits. Show the results with the help of graphs.Two firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2, compete by simultaneously choosing prices. Both firms sell an identical product for which each of 100 consumers has a maximum willingness to pay of $40. Each consumer will buy at most 1 unit, and will buy it from whichever firm charges the lowest price. If both firms set the same price, they share the market equally. Costs are given by c; (q) = 16q;. Because of government regulation, firms can only choose prices which are integer numbers, and they cannot price above $40. Answer the following: a) If Firm 1 chooses pi = 32, Firm 2's best response is to set what price? b) If Firm 2 chooses the price determined in the previous question, Firm 1's best response is to choose what price? c) If Firm 1 chooses pi = 9, Firm 2's best response is a range of prices. What is the lowest price in this range? d) Now suppose both firms are capacity-constrained: Firm 1 can produce at most 42 units, and Firm 2 can produce at most 44 units. If firms set different prices,…Suppose that two identical firms produce widgets and that they are the only firms in the market. The average and marginal cost is €60 for each firm. Price is determined by the following demand curve: P = 300 – Q where Q = Q1 + Q2. Suppose firm 1 is the leader and firm 2 is the follower. The output produced by each firm in a Stackelberg equilibrium is A. Firm 1 will produce 60 and Firm 2 will produce 120 B. Firm 1 will produce 80 and Firm 2 will produce 40 C. Firm 1 will produce 120 and Firm 2 will produce 40 D. Firm 1 will produce 120 and Firm 2 will produce 60
- Since you know all about perfect competition, monopoly, and oligopoly, we can find out how various types of firms might feel about uncertainty concerning the prices of its factors of production and output. Consider a profit-maximizing firm that produces a single good from several factors. The firm is characterized by a production function y = f(x1, ... , Xn), where y is the level of output obtainable from factor inputs x1, ... , Xn. We will use p to denote the price of the output good, and Wi to denote the price of factor input i. When there is uncertainty a priori about these prices, the firm is allowed to choose its production plan after any uncertainty in prices resolves. (c) Finally, consider this question in the context of a von Stackelberg duopoly. Two firms produce an undifferentiated commodity for which demand is given by P = A - X, where P is price and X is total supply. Demand-is unchanging. Each firm has production technology with a fixed cost F for producing anything at…Two firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2, compete by simultaneously choosing prices. Both firms sell an identical product for which each of 100 consumers has a maximum willingness to pay of $40. Each consumer will buy at most 1 unit, and will buy it from whichever firm charges the lowest price. If both firms set the same price, they share the market equally. Costs are given by C; (qi) = 16q¡ . Because of government regulation, firms can only choose prices which are integer numbers, and they cannot price above $40. Could you help me with these questions? a) If Firm 1 chooses Pi price? = 32, Firm 2's best response is to set what b) If Firm 2 chooses the price determined in the previous question, Firm 1's best response is to choose what price? c) If Firm 1 chooses p₁ = 9, Firm 2's best response is a range of prices. What is the lowest price in this range?Two firms compete in a homogeneous product market where the inverse demand function is P = 20 − 5Q (quantity is measured in millions). Firm 1 has been in business for one year, while firm 2 just recently entered the market. Each firm has a legal obligation to pay one year’s rent of $2 million regardless of its production decision. Firm 1’s marginal cost is $2 and firm 2’s marginal cost is $10. The current market price is $15 and was set optimally last year when firm 1 was the only firm in the market. At present, each firm has a 50 percent share of the market. a. Why do you think firm 1’s marginal cost is lower than firm 2’s marginal cost? b. Determine the current profits of the two firms. c. What would happen to each firm’s current profits if firm 1 reduced its price to $10 while firm 2 continued to charge $15? d. Suppose that, by cutting its price to $10, firm 1 is able to drive firm 2 completely out of the market. After firm 2 exits the market, does firm 1 have an incentive to raise…
- Consider a homogeneous good industry (such as an agricultural product) with just two firms and a total market demand Q = 400−P, so the inverse demand is P = 400 − Q. Suppose both firms have a constant marginal cost equal to $100 per unit of output and a fixed cost equal to $10,000. Suppose that the firms compete by simultaneously setting price, not simultaneously setting output. That is, suppose we consider the Bertrand model instead of the Cournot. Show that the two firms must earn lower profits. Hint: Create a two-by-two game using two different prices for each firm. One price should be the Cournot price (the Cournot is price of the good when firms produce the Cournot output you found above, which is 100 and 100, so the price is P = 400 − 100 − 100 = 200). The second price should be under 200 and over 150. Then show that the Nash equilibrium of this game is the lower of the two prices. When calculating profits, assume that each firm has equal sales (one half of demand) if they charge…Two firms compete in selling homogeneous goods. They choose their output levels q1 and q2 simultaneously and face demand curve P=80-6Q, where Q=q1+q2. The total cost function of firm 1 is C1=8q1 and the total cost function of firm 2 is C2=32q2+2/3. a) Find and draw the reaction curves of the two firms. b) Compute equilibrium quantities, price and profits. Suppose now that firm 2, thanks to a technological innovation, becomes more efficient. The new total cost function of firm 2 is C2= 8q2 c) Compute the new equilibrium quantities, price and profits.Consider a market demand function P=100-0.01Q. There are only two firms in the market and each firm's total cost function is 40q to produce identical products. Suppose Firm 1 is the first mover (leader) and Firm 2 is the follower. What is the optimal level of quantity for Firm 2 in this Stackelberg model? 1000 1500 2000 25000 3000
- Suppose that two European electronics companies, Siemens (Firm S) and Alcatel-Lucent (Firm T), jointly hold a patent on a component used in airport radar systems. - Demand for the component is given by the following function \[ P=1,000-Q \] - The total cost functions of manufacturing and selling the component for the respective firms are \[ \begin{array}{c} T C_{S}=70,000+5 Q_{S}+0.25 Q_{S}^{2} \\ T C_{T}=110,000+5 Q_{T}+0.15 Q_{T}^{2} \end{array} \] Assume that the firms agreed to form cartel and calculate the joint profit.Two firms compete in a homogeneous product market where the inverse demand function is P = 20 -5Q (quantity is measured in millions). Firm 1 has been in business for one year, while Firm 2 just recently entered the market. Each firm has a legal obligation to pay one year’s rent of $1.4 million regardless of its production decision. Firm 1’s marginal cost is $2, and Firm 2’s marginal cost is $10. The current market price is $15 and was set optimally last year when Firm 1 was the only firm in the market. At present, each firm has a 50 percent share of the market. b. Determine the current profits of the two firms. c. What would each firm’s current profits be if Firm 1 reduced its price to $10 while Firm 2 continued to charge $15?Assume the inverse demand function in a market is given by P ( Q ) = 500 − Q where Q is the total industry output, that is the sum of the output of all firms in the market. There are two firms (indexed by i = 1,2) who both have a cost of producing the good given by c ( q i ) = 10 ∗ q i The two firms are competing in the Cournot manner, that is they choose their quantities simultaneously in order to maximize profits. What is the best response of firm 1 if firm 2 chooses an output level of 200? (input a whole number:) The best response function of firm 1 with respect to firm 2's quantity choice takes the form: q 1 ( q 2 ) = w ∗ ( x − y ∗ q 2 − z ) where (w,x,y,z) are parameters of the problem. Solve for this best response function and provide the product (w*x*y*z) in the next blank: What is the Nash Equilibrium quantity produced by firm 1? (round to the nearest whole number)
