A recent study demonstrated that when states pass laws mandating that health insurance cover treatment for alcoholism, alcoholism rates in the state as well as alcohol related medical issues and drunk driving increase significantly. This is an example of: A. Adverse selection B. Risk spreading C. Moral hazard D. Opportunism

A recent study demonstrated that when states pass laws mandating that health insurance cover treatment for alcoholism, alcoholism rates in the state as well as alcohol related medical issues and drunk driving increase significantly. This is an example of: A. Adverse selection B. Risk spreading C. Moral hazard D. Opportunism

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter20: The Problem Of Adverse Selection Moral Hazard

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7MC

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Consider the following steps: 1. Celia chooses how much care, x ∈ [0, 1], to take in programming her robot. This effort costs her x^2/2. 2. Nature chooses whether the robot steps on Peter’s pet salamander, leading to emotional harm to Peter of H > 0 (with probability 1 − x). If the robot does step on the salamander then there is a chance of π that Celia will be identified as the culprit. - If there is no accident (the salamander is not stepped on), then Celia’s payoff is V − x^2/2. Peter and Luke both get zero. - If there is an accident, but Celia is not identified as the culprit, then Celia gets V − x^2/2. Peter gets −H. Luke gets zero. - If there is an accident, and Celia is identified as the culprit, then Luke (the judge) decides a level of compensation D ∈ R+ for Celia to pay Peter. Celia gets V − (x^2)/2−D. Peter gets D−H. Luke gets −(βH−D)^2. h) What would β have to equal, in order for Celia to choose the socially optimal level of x in a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ? We are…
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Consider the following steps Celia chooses how much care, x ∈ [0,1], to take in programming her robot. This effort costs her x^2/2. Nature chooses whether the robot steps on Peter’s pet salamander, leading to emotional harm to Peter of H > 0 (with probability 1 - x). If the robot does step on the salamander then there is a chance of π that Celia will be identified as the culprit. If there is no accident (the salamander is not stepped on), then Celia’s payoff is V - x^2/2. Peter and Luke both get zero. If there is an accident, but Celia is identified as the culprit, then Celia gets V - x^2/2. Peter gets -H. Luke gets zero. If there is an accident, and Celia is identified as the culprit, then Like (the judge) decides a level of compensation D ∈ R+ for Celia to pay Peter. Celia gets V - x^2/2 - D. Peter gets D - H. Luke gets −(βH - D)^2. f) Now we turn to social otimality rather than equilibrium. Consider the value judgement that the optimal level of care is…
Consider the following steps Celia chooses how much care, x ∈ [0,1], to take in programming her robot. This effort costs her x^2/2. Nature chooses whether the robot steps on Peter’s pet salamander, leading to emotional harm to Peter of H > 0 (with probability 1 - x). If the robot does step on the salamander then there is a chance of π that Celia will be identified as the culprit. If there is no accident (the salamander is not stepped on), then Celia’s payoff is V - x^2/2. Peter and Luke both get zero. If there is an accident, but Celia is identified as the culprit, then Celia gets V - x^2/2. Peter gets -H. Luke gets zero. If there is an accident, and Celia is identified as the culprit, then Like (the judge) decides a level of compensation D ∈ R+ for Celia to pay Peter. Celia gets V - x^2/2 - D. Peter gets D - H. Luke gets −(βH - D)^2. A) Draw a game tree to represent this model.
Consider the following steps Celia chooses how much care, x ∈ [0,1], to take in programming her robot. This effort costs her x^2/2. Nature chooses whether the robot steps on Peter’s pet salamander, leading to emotional harm to Peter of H > 0 (with probability 1 - x). If the robot does step on the salamander then there is a chance of π that Celia will be identified as the culprit. If there is no accident (the salamander is not stepped on), then Celia’s payoff is V - x^2/2. Peter and Luke both get zero. If there is an accident, but Celia is identified as the culprit, then Celia gets V - x^2/2. Peter gets -H. Luke gets zero. If there is an accident, and Celia is identified as the culprit, then Like (the judge) decides a level of compensation D ∈ R+ for Celia to pay Peter. Celia gets V - x^2/2 - D. Peter gets D - H. Luke gets −(βH - D)^2. h) What would β have to equal, in order for Celia to choose the socially optimal level of x in a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ?…
Consider the following steps Celia chooses how much care, x ∈ [0,1], to take in programming her robot. This effort costs her x^2/2. Nature chooses whether the robot steps on Peter’s pet salamander, leading to emotional harm to Peter of H > 0 (with probability 1 - x). If the robot does step on the salamander then there is a chance of π that Celia will be identified as the culprit. If there is no accident (the salamander is not stepped on), then Celia’s payoff is V - x^2/2. Peter and Luke both get zero. If there is an accident, but Celia is identified as the culprit, then Celia gets V - x^2/2. Peter gets -H. Luke gets zero. If there is an accident, and Celia is identified as the culprit, then Like (the judge) decides a level of compensation D ∈ R+ for Celia to pay Peter. Celia gets V - x^2/2 - D. Peter gets D - H. Luke gets −(βH - D)^2. b) Write down Celia's expected payoff when she chooses x in step 1.