A small town has 300 people, all of whom are interested only in private consumption and in the quality of the city streets. The utility function of person i is given by U(X₁, G) = X₁ + A₁G - B₁G², where X₂ is the amount of money that person i has to spend on private goods and G is the amount of money that the town spends on fixing its streets. There are 3 types of people, and each type has 100 people. The parameters in their utility function s given by

A small town has 300 people, all of whom are interested only in private consumption and in the quality of the city streets. The utility function of person i is given by U(X₁, G) = X₁ + A₁G - B₁G², where X₂ is the amount of money that person i has to spend on private goods and G is the amount of money that the town spends on fixing its streets. There are 3 types of people, and each type has 100 people. The parameters in their utility function s given by

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter19: Externalities And Public Goods

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 19.7P

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The answer is not quasi-private. Already tried that choice