Alec and Ellie are the only detectives in the town of Broadchurch. Assume efficient production. Each has 97 hours a week to allocate between conducting interviews and completing paperwork. They work independently and do not trade any jobs. Right now they each spend half their time completing paperwork and half their time conducting interviews. Alec takes 37 hours to complete one interview or 2 hours to complete one file of paperwork. Ellie takes 14 hours to complete one interview or 20 hours to complete one file of paperwork. A trade is proposed between Alec and Ellie at the following price: 1 interview for 2.8 files of paperwork. If they trade at this price, they will fully specialize. At this price, what is the total number of interviews conducted in Broadchurch in a week? Enter a number only.

Alec and Ellie are the only detectives in the town of Broadchurch. Assume efficient production. Each has 97 hours a week to allocate between conducting interviews and completing paperwork. They work independently and do not trade any jobs. Right now they each spend half their time completing paperwork and half their time conducting interviews. Alec takes 37 hours to complete one interview or 2 hours to complete one file of paperwork. Ellie takes 14 hours to complete one interview or 20 hours to complete one file of paperwork. A trade is proposed between Alec and Ellie at the following price: 1 interview for 2.8 files of paperwork. If they trade at this price, they will fully specialize. At this price, what is the total number of interviews conducted in Broadchurch in a week? Enter a number only.

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter16: Bargaining

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8MC

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