Alice and Bob are playing a repeated game in which a certain stage game is played twice in succession. All behaviour in the first period is observed by both players before the second period commences. In the stage game, Alice has 3 pure strategies and Bob has 2 pure strategies. How many pure strategies does Bob have in the repeated game? (If necessary, use a calculator to compute this number.) 2 6 2187 3 36 64 7 729 128 216 Please do fast ASAP fast

Alice and Bob are playing a repeated game in which a certain stage game is played twice in succession. All behaviour in the first period is observed by both players before the second period commences. In the stage game, Alice has 3 pure strategies and Bob has 2 pure strategies. How many pure strategies does Bob have in the repeated game? (If necessary, use a calculator to compute this number.) 2 6 2187 3 36 64 7 729 128 216 Please do fast ASAP fast

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter7: Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7.3P

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