An efficient market for risk, such as an insurance market, is MOST likely to exist: a. when the sellers of insurance are risk- averse but the purchasers are not. O b. when there is a level playing field so that all participants have approximately the same wealth and the same degree of risk aversion. c. in the presence of private, or asymmetric, information. d. when there are significant differences between individuals' wealth levels and attitudes toward risk.

An efficient market for risk, such as an insurance market, is MOST likely to exist: a. when the sellers of insurance are risk- averse but the purchasers are not. O b. when there is a level playing field so that all participants have approximately the same wealth and the same degree of risk aversion. c. in the presence of private, or asymmetric, information. d. when there are significant differences between individuals' wealth levels and attitudes toward risk.

Brief Principles of Macroeconomics (MindTap Course List)

8th Edition

ISBN:9781337091985

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter9: The Basic Tools Of Finance

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 5PA

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