An insurance company estimates that drivers have a 5% chance of getting into an accident that will cost the driver $10,000. There are two types of drivers: the ones with $50,000 in the bank and the ones with only $5,000. In case of an accident those with $5,000 will declare bankruptcy and creditors can only recover $5,000. What is the fair pair of insurance and will those with $5,000 in the bank buy it? Why?

An insurance company estimates that drivers have a 5% chance of getting into an accident that will cost the driver $10,000. There are two types of drivers: the ones with $50,000 in the bank and the ones with only $5,000. In case of an accident those with $5,000 will declare bankruptcy and creditors can only recover $5,000. What is the fair pair of insurance and will those with $5,000 in the bank buy it? Why?

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter17: Making Decisions With Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7MC

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