Analysts have estimated the inverse market demand in a homogeneous-product Cournot duopoly to be P= 200 - 3(Q1 + Q2). They estimate costs to be G(Q1)= 26Q1 and C2(Q2)=32Q2- a. Determine the reaction function for each firm. Firm 1: Q₁ = Firm 2: Q2= Q2 Q1 b. Calculate each firm's equilibrium output. Firm 1: Firm 2: c. Calculate the equilibrium market price. $ d. Calculate the profit each firm earns in equilibrium. Firm 1: $ Firm 2: $

The inverse market demand in a homogeneous-product Cournot duopoly is P = 200 − 3(Q1 + Q2) and costs are C1(Q1) = 26Q1 and C2(Q2) = 32Q2. a. Determine the reaction function for each firm. b. Calculate each firm’s equilibrium output. c. Calculate the equilibrium market price. d. Calculate the profit each firm earns in equilibrium.

The inverse market demand in a homogeneous-product Cournot duopoly is P = 100 – 2(Q1 + Q2) and costs are C1(Q1) = 20Q1 and C2(Q2) = 30Q2. a. What is the reaction function for each firm?                                                              b. What is each firm’s equilibrium output? c. What is the equilibrium market price?                                                                               d. What is the profit each firm earns in equilibrium?

Give typing answer with explanation and conclusion to all parts  Analysts have estimated the inverse market demand in a homogeneous-product Cournot duopoly to be P = 130 −2 (Q1 + Q2). They estimate costs to be C1(Q1) = 22Q1 and C2(Q2) = 34Q2.   Determine the reaction function for each firm.   Firm 1: Q1 = ___ − ___Q2   Firm 2: Q2 = ___ − ___ Q1   Calculate each firm’s equilibrium output.   Firm 1: ___ Firm 2: ___   Calculate the equilibrium market price. ___   Calculate the profit each firm earns in equilibrium.   Firm 1: $ ___ Firm 2: $ ___

In a homogeneous products duopoly, each firm has a marginal cost curve MC= 10, i= 1,2. The market inverse demand curve is P= 50−Q, where Q = Q1+Q2.   a) What would be the equilibrium price in this market if firms acted as price-taking firms?   b) What would be the equilibrium price in this market if the two firms acted as a profit-maximizing cartel? Obtain the Lerner index   c) What would be the Cournot equilibrium quantities, price and profit in this market? Obtain the Lerner index of each firm and compare it to b)

Answer the given question with a proper explanation and step-by-step solution.    Suppose we have a duopoly of a homogeneous product with demand Q = 10 – P/2. The cost function of each firm is C = 10 + q*(q+1).Determine the Cournot equilibrium price and quantity.

The market demand in a homogeneous-product Cournot duopoly is P = 100 - 2Q, where Q=Q1+Q2 (Firm 1 and Firm 2), and the costs functions for each firms are: TC1 = 12Q1 and TC2 = 20Q2.  Instructions: Use no decimals. Use the average cost to calculate monopoly profits. Do not round if values are used to complete other calculations. Complete the following table.   Q1 Q2 P Profits F1 Profits F2 Duopoly competition           Collusion

The inverse demand for a homogeneous-product Stackelberg duopoly is P = 12,000 −5Q. The cost structures for the leader and the follower, respectively, are CL(QL) = 4,000QL and CF (QF) = 5,000QF.a. What is the follower’s reaction function?  QF = − QLb. Determine the equilibrium output level for both the leader and the follower.Leader output:   Follower output: c. Determine the equilibrium market price.  $ d. Determine the profits of the leader and the follower.Leader profits: $   Follower profits: $

Two identical firms currently serve a market. Each has a cost function of C(q) = 30q. Market demand is P(Q) = 80 − 0.01Q. The firms compete by setting prices simultaneously as in Bertrand competition. Let PB represent the equilibrium Bertrand duopoly price.The firms have proposed to merge, and they announce that this merger will result in considerable cost savings. The firms’ new cost function will have the form Cm(q) = cq + 100, 000. Note that the merged firm has positive fixed costs while the unmerged firms do not.   (a) What is the merged firm’s profit-maximizing price if the merger is approved? Is it possible for the cost savings (via c < PB) to be sufficiently large for the merged firms’ profit-maximizing price to be below the duopoly equilibrium price? (b) Suppose that the Department of Justice permits the merger with the requirement that the new (post-merger) price must be no greater than the pre-merger price. Under what circumstances are the firms willing to go through with…

A duopoly faces an inverse market demand of P(Q) = 150−Q.Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of MC1 (q1) = ​$30.Firm​ 2's constant marginal cost is MC2 (q2) =​ $60.Assume fixed costs are negligible for both firms. Calculate the output of each​ firm, market​ output, and price if there is​ (A) a collusive equilibrium or​ (B) a Cournot equilibrium.   ​(A) Collusive equilibrium ​(Enter your responses rounded to two decimal​ places)   The collusive equilibrium occurs where q1  equals ?and q2 equals ?   Market output is ?   The collusive equilibrium price is ?     ​(B) Cournot equilibrium ​(Enter your responses using rounded to two decimal​ places)   The​ Nash-Cournot equilibrium occurs where q1 equals ? and q2  equals ?   Market output is ?   The equilibrium occurs at a price of ? ​