Consider a Cournot duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 600 − 6Q1 − 6Q2 . The firms' marginal costs are identical and are given by MCi(Qi) = 3Qi. Based on this information, firm 1 and 2's marginal revenue functions are a. MR1(Q1,Q2) = 600 − 12Q1 − 6Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 600 − 6Q1 − 12Q2. b. MR1(Q1,Q2) = 600 − 6Q1 − 12Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 600 − 12Q1 − 6Q2. c. MR1(Q1,Q2) = 600 − 12Q1 − 12Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 600 − 12Q1 − 12Q2 d. MR1(Q1,Q2) = 300 − 12Q1 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 300 − 12Q2.

Consider a Cournot duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 600 − 6Q1 − 6Q2 . The firms' marginal costs are identical and are given by MCi(Qi) = 3Qi. Based on this information, firm 1 and 2's marginal revenue functions are a. MR1(Q1,Q2) = 600 − 12Q1 − 6Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 600 − 6Q1 − 12Q2. b. MR1(Q1,Q2) = 600 − 6Q1 − 12Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 600 − 12Q1 − 6Q2. c. MR1(Q1,Q2) = 600 − 12Q1 − 12Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 600 − 12Q1 − 12Q2 d. MR1(Q1,Q2) = 300 − 12Q1 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 300 − 12Q2.

Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)

14th Edition

ISBN:9781305506381

Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Publisher:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Chapter12: Price And Output Determination: Oligopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 2E

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Consider a Cournot duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 400 − 3Q1 − 3Q2 . The firms' marginal costs are identical and are given by MCi(Qi) = 2Qi. Based on this information, firm 1 and 2's marginal revenue functions are Multiple Choice MR1(Q1,Q2) = 400 − 6Q1 − 3Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 400 − 3Q1 − 6Q2. MR1(Q1,Q2) = 200 − 6Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 200 − 3Q1. MR1(Q1,Q2) = 200 − 3Q1 − 3Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 200 − Q1 − 3Q2. MR1(Q1,Q2) = 400 − 6Q1 − 6Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 400 − 6Q1 − 6Q2.
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