Consider a labor market where the matching function UV is given by H (U,V) = A, where A=0.5. U+V' There are U = 3 job seekers and V = 6 job openings. The probability for a job seeker to find a job in a given period of time is Round your answers to 2 decimal places (for example, 3.454 should be rounded down to 3.45, and 3.455 should be rounded up to 3.46).

Consider a labor market where the matching function UV is given by H (U,V) = A, where A=0.5. U+V' There are U = 3 job seekers and V = 6 job openings. The probability for a job seeker to find a job in a given period of time is Round your answers to 2 decimal places (for example, 3.454 should be rounded down to 3.45, and 3.455 should be rounded up to 3.46).

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter7: Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7.7P

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