Consider a market that is a Bertrand oligopoly with 5 firms in the market. Each of these firms produce an identical product and each have the same cost function of C(Q) = 80Q. The inverse market demand for this product is P = 2480 – 2Q. How much does EACH firm produce at the equilibrium price?
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Consider a market that is a Bertrand oligopoly with 5 firms in the market. Each of these firms produce an identical product and each have the same cost function of C(Q) = 80Q. The inverse market
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- Consider a market for crude oil production. There are two firms in the market. The marginal cost of firm 1 is 20, while that of firm 2 is 20. The marginal cost is assumed to be constant. The inverse demand for crude oil is P(Q)=200-Q, where Q is the total production in the market. These two firms are engaging in Cournot competition. Find the production quantity of firm 1 in Nash equilibrium. If necessary, round off two decimal places and answer up to one decimal place.Consider a market that is a Bertrand oligopoly with 5 firms in the market. Each of these firms produce an identical product and each have the same cost function of C(Q) = 80Q. The inverse market demand for this product is P = 2480 – 2Q. What is the equilibrium market price?Suppose a market is served by two firms (a duopoly). The market demand function given by P = 1200 - Q_{1} - Q_{2} where Q_{1} is the output produced by firm and Q_{2} is the output produced by firm 2 . Firm cost of production is given by the function C(Q_{t}) = 120Q_{t} and firm 2's cost of production is given by the function C(Q_{2}) = 120Q_{2} The average cost of firm 1 is given by A*C_{1} = 120 and the average cost of firm 2 is given by A*C_{2} = 120 Marginal profit function for firm 1: Delta pi 1 Delta Q 1 equiv1080-2Q 1 -Q 2; (d*pi_{2})/(Delta*Q_{2}) = 1080 - Q_{1} - 2Q_{2} Marginal profit function for firm 2: What will be the equilibrium profit levels earned by the Stackelberg leader firm and the Stackelberg follower firm?
- A community's demand for monthly subscription to a streaming music service is shown by the following table. Assume that there are only two firms serving this market (Firm A and Firm B), each firm offers the same quality of service and music selection, and that each firm’s marginal cost is constant and equal to 0 (zero). (please refer to table provided) If this market were highly competitive instead of a duopoly, the quantity of streaming movie subscriptions purchased each month would be ______ If the two firms agreed to each supply one half of the quantity a monopoly would supply, the contract would specify that each firm would supply ____Suppose there are just two firms, 1 and 2, in the oil market and the inverse demand for oil is given by P = 60 – Q. The marginal cost for each firm is €24. What price should Firm 1 charge at the Cournot equilibrium?Suppose that Raleigh and Dawes are the only sellers of bicycles in the UK. The inverse market demand function for bicycles is P(Y)=200-2Y. Both firms have the same total cost function: TC(Y)=12Y and the same marginal cost: MC(Y)=12. Suppose this market is a Stackelberg oligopoly, and Raleigh is the first mover. Write down a formula for the reaction function of Dawes. Calculate the equilibrium quantity that each firm produces and the equilibrium price in the market. Give typing answer with explanation and conclusion
- Two identical firms currently serve a market. Each has a cost function of C(q) = 30q. Market demand is P(Q) = 80 − 0.01Q. The firms compete by setting prices simultaneously as in Bertrand competition. Let PB represent the equilibrium Bertrand duopoly price.The firms have proposed to merge, and they announce that this merger will result in considerable cost savings. The firms’ new cost function will have the form Cm(q) = cq + 100, 000. Note that the merged firm has positive fixed costs while the unmerged firms do not. (a) What is the merged firm’s profit-maximizing price if the merger is approved? Is it possible for the cost savings (via c < PB) to be sufficiently large for the merged firms’ profit-maximizing price to be below the duopoly equilibrium price? (b) Suppose that the Department of Justice permits the merger with the requirement that the new (post-merger) price must be no greater than the pre-merger price. Under what circumstances are the firms willing to go through with…. The market for widgets consists of two firms that produce identical products. Competition in the market is such that each of the firms independently produces a quantity of output, and these quantities are then sold in the market at a price that is determined by the total amount produced by the two firms. Firm 2 is known to have a cost advantage over firm 1. A recent study found that the (inverse) market demand curve faced by the two firms is P = 280 – 2(Q1 + Q2), and costs are C1(Q1) = 3Q1 and C2(Q2) = 2Q2. a. Determine the marginal revenue for each firm. b. Determine the reaction function for each firm.Duopoly and menu costs. (This is adapted from CaminaI 1987.) Consider two firms producing imperfect substitutes. Both firms can produce at zero marginal cost. The demand for the good produced by firm i is given by Now suppose that both firms enter the period with price p., which is the Nash equilibrium price for some value of a, a·. They know b and c. They each observe the value of a for the period, and each firm must independently quote a price for the period. If it wants to quote a price different from p*, it must pay a cost k. Otherwise, it pays nothing. Once prices are quoted, demand is allocated, demand determines produdion, and profits are realized. (b) Compute the set of values of a (around a*) for which not to adjust prices is a Nash equilibrium. (c) Compute the set of values of a (around a*) for which to adjust prices is a Nash equilibrium. (d) Check that all equilibria are symmetric and therefore that there are no other equilibria than the ones computed above.…
- Two firms compete by choosing price. Their demand functions are: Q1 = 20 -P1 +P2 and Q2 = 20 - P1 + P2 where P1 and P2 are the prices charged by each firm, respectively, and Q1 and Q2 are the resulting demands. Note that the demand for each good depends only on the difference in prices; if the two firms colluded and set the same price, they could make that price as high as they wanted and earn infinite profits. Marginal costs are zero.a. Suppose the two firms set their prices at the same time. Find the resulting Nash equilibrium. What price will each firm charge, how much will it sell, and what will its profit be? (Hint: Maximize the profit of each firm with respect to its price.) {15 Marks}b. Suppose Firm 1 sets its price first and then Firm 2 sets its price. What price will each firm charge, how much will it sell, and what will its profit be? {10 Marks}c. Suppose you are one of these firms and that there are three ways you could play the game: (i) Both firms set price at the same…Consider a Bertrand duopoly where market demand is P(Q)=107-5Q. Each firm faces a marginal cost $18 and no fixed cost. what is one market price that can occur in a Nash equilibrium?Consider a Cournot duopoly. The market demand function is P = 180 – 2(q₂ + q₂), where P is the market price, q₂ is the output produced by Firm 1 and q₂ is the output produced by Firm 2. The two firms have a constant marginal cost c = 30. What is the total output in this market? Round your answer to the nearest integer (e.g. 50)