Consider the following bargaining game with four rounds: Players 1 and 2 divide a pie of size 1. Both players have a common discount factor, δ = 0.8. In the first round (player 1 proposes): player 1 proposes x ∈ [0, 1]. If player 2 accepts the offer, then player 1 gets x, and player 2 gets 1−x. If player 2 rejects the offer, the game proceeds to round 2. In the second round (player 2 proposes): player 2 proposes y ∈ [0, 1]. If player 1 accepts the offer, then player 1 gets δy, and player 2 gets δ − δy. If player 2 rejects the offer, the game proceeds to round 3. In the third round (player 1 proposes): player 1 proposes z ∈ [0, 1]. If player 2 accepts the offer, player 1 gets δ2z, and player 2 gets δ2 − δ2z. If player 2 rejects the offer, the game proceeds to round 4. In the fourth and final round (player 2 proposes): player 2 proposes u ∈ [0, 1]. If player 1 accepts the offer, player 1 gets δ3u, and player 2 gets δ3 −δ3u. If player 1 rejects the offer, everyone gets 0. 1. What would be the SPNE of the game?

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
5th Edition
ISBN:9781337106665
Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Chapter15: Strategic Games
Section: Chapter Questions
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Consider the following bargaining game with four rounds: Players 1 and 2 divide a pie of size

1. Both players have a common discount factor, δ = 0.8.

In the first round (player 1 proposes): player 1 proposes x ∈ [0, 1]. If player 2 accepts

the offer, then player 1 gets x, and player 2 gets 1−x. If player 2 rejects the offer, the game

proceeds to round 2.

In the second round (player 2 proposes): player 2 proposes y ∈ [0, 1]. If player 1 accepts

the offer, then player 1 gets δy, and player 2 gets δ − δy. If player 2 rejects the offer, the

game proceeds to round 3.

In the third round (player 1 proposes): player 1 proposes z ∈ [0, 1]. If player 2 accepts

the offer, player 1 gets δ2z, and player 2 gets δ2 − δ2z. If player 2 rejects the offer, the game

proceeds to round 4.

In the fourth and final round (player 2 proposes): player 2 proposes u ∈ [0, 1]. If player

1 accepts the offer, player 1 gets δ3u, and player 2 gets δ3 −δ3u. If player 1 rejects the offer,

everyone gets 0.

1. What would be the SPNE of the game? 

 

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