Consider the following Von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions of two different decision takers (i) and (ii): (1) v, = a- be(-Ay) (ii) V = a+ bln(y) where a e R,b>0, A>0, y > 0.
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- Consider the following claim: “If a decision maker prefers one given lottery that yields $x with probability 1 over another given lottery whose expected return is $x, then we can fully characterize the agent's risk attitude. That is, this information comparing two given lotteries is enough to determine if the decision maker is risk averse, risk loving or risk neutral.” If this claim is TRUE, then provide a proof. If it is FALSE, then prove your argument by providing an explanation.Can you explain how Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility function should be understood and how it works mathematicallyLet U(x)= x^(beta/2) denote an agent's utility function, where Beta > 0 is a parameter that defines the agent's attitude towards risk. Consider a gamble that pays a prize X = 10 with probability 0.2, a price X = 50 with probability 0.4 and a price X = 100 with probability 0.4. Compute the agentís expected utility for such gamble and find the value of Beta such that the agentis risk neutral? Suppose B= 1, what is the certainty equivalent of the gamble described above? What is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion?
- Find the Pratt - Arrow risk - aversion function for a utility function U(W) = log(0.5-W + 500), where W is the amount of wealth in €. Suppose that an investor's wealth is subject to outcomes -800 €, 500 €, 500 € and 1, 000 € which affect the initial amount of 2,500 € with probabilities of their occurrence 40%, 15%, 15% and 30%, respectively. a) Using the Taylor approximation to certainty equivalent, calculate an approximate expected utility value. b) Calculate the certain equivalent of the investor's uncertain wealth. Interpret.The preferences of agents A and B are representable by expected utility functions such that uA(x) = 5x^1/3 +30, and uB(x)= 1/5x - 20. Then, the following allocation of the expected returns of a risky joint investment of A and B as represented by lottery L = ((2/3);1500), (1/3);120)) is Pareto efficient: (a) xA = (500,100), xB = (1000,20) (b) xA = (100,100), xB= (1300,20) (c) xA= (80,80), xB = (1420,40) (d) xA = (750,60), xB= (750,60) (e) NOPACConsider the following utility functions for wealth w: (i) u(w) = 3w, (ii) u(w) = w^1/3, (iii) u(w) = w + sqrt(w), (iv) u(w) = w*sqrt(w). Which of these is most risk-averse (has the highest Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion) at w = 1?A. (i)B. (ii)C. (iii)D. (iv)
- Apple and Google are interested in hiring a new CEO. Both firms have the same set of final candidates for the CEO position: Indra, Cao, and Virginia. Both firms need to decide who to make a job offer to, and the hiring process is such that they each only make one job offer.If, say, Apple makes a job offer to Indra and Google makes a job offer to one of the other candidates, then Apple’s probability of success in hiring Indra is pIndra. The same is true for Google. If they both make a job offer to Indra, each has probability pIndra/2 of success. It has been estimated that pIndra = 20%, and pCao = pVirginia = 30% (Note that these probabilities need not add up to 100%).Suppose that both Apple and Google attach a valuation of 10 to successfully hiring Indra, and a valuation of 7 to successfully hiring each of the other candidates. A hiring attempt, if unsuccessful, has a valuation of zero. (a) Convert this story into a game by completing the following game table;GoogleIndra Cao…Apple and Google are interested in hiring a new CEO. Both firms have the same set of final candidates for the CEO position: Indra, Cao, and Virginia. Both firms need to decide who to make a job offer to, and the hiring process is such that they each only make one job offer. If, say, Apple makes a job offer to Indra and Google makes a job offer to one of the other candidates, then Apple’s probability of success in hiring Indra is pIndra. The same is true for Google. If they both make a job offer to Indra, each has probability pIndra/2 of success. It has been estimated that pIndra = 20%, and pCao = pVirginia = 30% (Note that these probabilities need not add up to 100%). Suppose that both Apple and Google attach a valuation of 10 to successfully hiring Indra, and a valuation of 7 to successfully hiring each of the other candidates. A hiring attempt, if unsuccessful, has a valuation of zero. Convert this story into a game by completing the following game table; Google…Indicate whether the statement is true or false, and justify your answer.Risk-averse individuals have a concave value function for prospective gains and a convex value function for prospective losses.
- Consider a variant of the benchmark model of adverse selection. The types of workers (θ) are uniformly drawn from the unit interval [0,1]. A θ-type worker can produce θ units of some product if he is hired by firms. (Workers are the only input in the production.) The price of the product is normalised as 1. Before entering the labor market, workers decide whether to secure some certificate at a cost c ∈ (0, 1) or not. The certificate can fully reveal a worker’s type and he then decides whether to show it to firms or not. If a θ-type worker decides to quit the labor market, he can earn θ/4 from self-employment. Find the competitive equilibrium. (Hint, if a θ-type worker obtains the certificate and shows it to firms, he will receive a wage of θ from the market. For sure, he can also decide to join the labor market without obtaining or showing the certificate.)Consider the St. Petersburg Paradox problem first discussed by Daniel Bernoulli in 1738. The game consists of tossing a coin. The player gets a payoff of 2^n where n is the number of times the coin is tossed to get the first head. So, if the sequence of tosses yields TTTH, you get a payoff of 2^4 this payoff occurs with probability (1/2^4). Compute the expected value of playing this game. Next, assume that utility U is a function of wealth X given by U = X.5 and that X = $1,000,000. In this part of the question, assume that the game ends if the first head has not occurred after 40 tosses of the coin. In that case, the payoff is 240 and the game is over. What is the expected payout of this game? Finally, what is the most you would pay to play the game if you require that your expected utility after playing the game must be equal to your utility before playing the game? Use the Goal Seek function (found in Data, What-If Analysis) in Excel.Consider two individuals whose utility function over wealth I is ?(?) = √?. Both people face a 10 percent chance of getting sick, and foreach the total cost of illness equals $50,000. Suppose person A has a total net worth of $100,000, and person B has a total net worth of $1,000,000. Both people have the option to buy an actuarially fair insurance contract that would fully insure them against the cost of the illness. a. Using expected utility calculations, show that person A would certainly buy full, actuarially fair insurance. b. Suppose an insurance company wants to maximize profits and wants to charge each customer the maximum price they are willing to pay. How much should the insurance company charge each client so that both buy the contract? c. What is surprising about your result in part b? What does this tell you about how insurance companies may be pricing health insurance contracts in the real world?