Consider two firms facing the demand curve where Q = Q1 + Q2. The firms' cost functions are and P=90-5Q, C₁ (Q1) = 15+5Q1 C2 (Q2) = 15+ 10Q2 Suppose that both firms have entered the industry. What is the joint profit-maximizing level of output? How much will each firm produce? Combined, the firms will produce units of output, of which Firm 1 will produce ☐ units and Firm 2 will produce units. (Enter a numeric response using a real number rounded to two decimal places.)

I alrready got the first half answered, I need the second half.   JointJuice produces a prepackaged joint support supplement for relief of joint pain with 180 tablets per bottle and operates in a perfectly competitive market. Basically, all the firms in this competitive market have technologies (production and cost conditions) that are the same as JointJuice’s. Suppose JointJuice’s total cost function is given by the following where q is JointJuice’s quantity of packages per day: C(q) = 250 + 6q + 0.1q^2   The market demand function for the output in this market is given by: Q = 1848 - 2P If there are 20 identical firms in this industry, find the market equilibrium price for the prepackaged supplements. Calculate JointJuice’s optimal output level and profits given the market price for the product. If JointJuice is typical of the firms in this industry calculate the firm’s long-run equilibrium output, price, and profit level. Suppose the situation changes. JointJuice has its plant in…

There are only two driveway paving companies in a small town, Asphalt, Inc. and Blacktop Bros. The inverse demand curve for paving services is ?= 2040 ―20? where quantity is measured in pave jobs per month and price is measured in dollars per job. Assume Asphalt, Inc. has a marginal cost of $100 per driveway and Blacktop Bros. has a marginal cost of $150. Answer the following questions: Determine each firm’s reaction curve and graph it. How many paving jobs will each firm produce in Cournot equilibrium? What will the market price of a pave job be? How much profit does each firm earn?

Only two firms, Acme and Stuff Inc., sell a particular product. The table below shows the demand curve for their product. Each firm has the same constant marginal cost of $10 and zero fixed cost (so MC-ATC=$10). Price Quantity Total Revenues 10 70 65 60 55 50 45 40 28889 35 30 25 20 15 10 15 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 0 If Acme and Stuff Inc are able to collude, how much will Acme produce? 6500 12000 16500 20000 22500 24000 24500 24000 22500 20000 16500 12000 6500 0

Please solve D and E part only. Thankyou.   Consider three firms, each with cost function C(qi)=4qi, currently competing Cournot. Market demand is P = 20 – Q.   a. a. Find the quantities, price, and profits of each firm in equilibrium.     b. Imagine firms1 and 2 merged to become one, so after the merger there are now two firms left in the market, firm 1&2 and firm 3. Assume there are no cost efficiencies expected and assume that the two firms play Cournot as before. Find the quantities, price, and profits of each firm in equilibrium   c. Was it profitable for firms 1 and 2 to merge in the first place?   d. Continuing with b., imagine that firms did not play Cournot after the merger, but rather that the merged firm 1&2 became a Stackelberg leader after the merger and firm 3 became the Stackelberg follower. If this were the case, find the quantities, price, and profits of each firm in equilibrium.   e. Was it profitable for firms 1 and 2 to merge in the first place? Did price…

Firms J and K produce compact-disc players and compete againstone another. Each firm can develop either an economy player (E)or a deluxe player (D). According to the best available marketresearch, the firms’ resulting profits are given by the accompanyingpayoff table.a. The firms make their decision independently, and each is seeking itsown maximum profit. Is it possible to make a confident predictionconcerning their actions and the outcome? Explain.Firm KE DE 30, 55 50, 60 Firm JD 40, 75 25, 50b. Suppose that firm J has a lead in development and so can move first.What action should J take, and what will be K’s response?c. What will be the outcome if firm K can move first?

usiness EconomicsQ&A LibraryTwo firms A and B produce an identical product (Note: Industry Output = Q). The firms have to decide how much output qA and qB  (Note: qA = Firm A Output; qB =  Firm B Output) they must produce since they are the only two firms in the industry that manufacture this product. Their marginal cost (MC) is equal to their average cost (AC) and it is constant at MC = AC = X, for both firms.  Market demand is given as Q = Y – 2P (where P = price and Q = quantity).  Select any value for X between [21 – 69] and any value for Y between [501 – 999].  Using this information, calculate the Industry Price, Industry Output, Industry Profit, Consumer Surplus and Deadweight Loss under each of the following models:       (a) Cournot Model Two firms A and B produce an identical product (Note: Industry Output = Q). The firms have to decide how much output qA and qB  (Note: qA = Firm A Output; qB =  Firm B Output) they must produce since they are the only two firms in…

1. if the total cost function for this market is TC = 500 + 10Q2 , calculate the total and marginal costs for each of the quantities in the table. what is the demand function for this market?  2. What are the profit-maximizing quantity, price, and profit for this market?   3. If there are two firms Atlas and Bowden in this market with the same earlier total cost function and they engage in Cournot competition, what is each firm's equilibrium quantity, price, and profit? [NB: round quantities to nearest integer to find equilibrium quantity, price, and profit]

In the model of Bertrand Competition, it been found that firms would compete, driving price down to marginal cost so that firms make zero economic profits.  This means there are firms essentially behaving as if they are perfectly competitive, even with just two firms. Despite this very clear prediction, evidence of this outcome is not ofter seen, even in markets where it is believed that firms are indeed competing via price.  Why might this be? For instance, what assumptions are made about costs of firms and how might things play out if those assumptions fail? What are some things firms could do in this situation to prevent prices from dropping as low as marginal cost, even if the assumptions on costs are true?

Q1: What is the price-equillibrium under the assumption of the two companies colluding? What is the profit for each firm?  Q2: Derive the output reaction curves for both firms and calculate the price-output equllibrium under this assumption. What is the profit for each firm?