Mavi and Diesel both make basic blue jeans. The demand curves for the two firms are given by Qm=135,000−3000Pm+1200Pd Qd=154,000−4000Pd+1000Pw suppose it is a price equilibrium for Mavi to set a price of $30 per pair of jeans and Diesel to set a price of $25. What is marginal cost for Mavi What is marginal cost for Diesel

Mavi and Diesel both make basic blue jeans. The demand curves for the two firms are given by Qm=135,000−3000Pm+1200Pd Qd=154,000−4000Pd+1000Pw suppose it is a price equilibrium for Mavi to set a price of $30 per pair of jeans and Diesel to set a price of $25. What is marginal cost for Mavi What is marginal cost for Diesel

Exploring Economics

8th Edition

ISBN:9781544336329

Author:Robert L. Sexton

Publisher:Robert L. Sexton

Chapter15: Oligopoly And Strategic Behavior

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 16P

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