田 COUNTRY B HIGH TARIFF LOW TARIFF HIGH TARIFF $1M $1 M $2M, $1.5 M COUNTRY A LOW TARIFF $1.5 M, $ 2M $3м, $3 м 1. What is the dominant strategy for: a. Country A b. Country B c. Is there an equilibrium dominant strategy for this game? 2. Find the Nash equilibrium a. Outcome = (High, high) b. Outcome = (High. Low) c. Outcome = (Low, high) d. Outcome = (Low, low) 3. What is the Maximin strategy for Country A and Country B? %3D

田 COUNTRY B HIGH TARIFF LOW TARIFF HIGH TARIFF $1M $1 M $2M, $1.5 M COUNTRY A LOW TARIFF $1.5 M, $ 2M $3м, $3 м 1. What is the dominant strategy for: a. Country A b. Country B c. Is there an equilibrium dominant strategy for this game? 2. Find the Nash equilibrium a. Outcome = (High, high) b. Outcome = (High. Low) c. Outcome = (Low, high) d. Outcome = (Low, low) 3. What is the Maximin strategy for Country A and Country B? %3D

Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)

8th Edition

ISBN:9781305585126

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter17: Oligopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 5CQQ

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