Paragraph Font Consider an individual who initially works T-L. hours per week, where (T-L)>0. They earn an hourly wage (W) and no non-labour income. a) Draw a graph that reflects this individual's income-leisure constraint, utility-maximizing indifference curve (U.) and choice of leisure hours (L.). b) The government then implements a wage subsidy program in which worker wages are increased by 10%. This wage subsidy program has no limits, so there is no phase-in/out. This wage subsidy produces both an income effect and a substitution effect on the worker's choice of leisure hours. Assume that the substītution effect is stronger than the income effect. On the same graph as part a, draw this individual's new income-leisure constraint, utility- maximizing indifference curve (U.) and choice of leisure hours (L). [Note: When incorporating the 10% wage subsidy into the graph in part b, I am not expecting perfect precision. Just try your best to draw the new income-leisure constraint as though a 10% wage subsidy has been added.]

Paragraph Font Consider an individual who initially works T-L. hours per week, where (T-L)>0. They earn an hourly wage (W) and no non-labour income. a) Draw a graph that reflects this individual's income-leisure constraint, utility-maximizing indifference curve (U.) and choice of leisure hours (L.). b) The government then implements a wage subsidy program in which worker wages are increased by 10%. This wage subsidy program has no limits, so there is no phase-in/out. This wage subsidy produces both an income effect and a substitution effect on the worker's choice of leisure hours. Assume that the substītution effect is stronger than the income effect. On the same graph as part a, draw this individual's new income-leisure constraint, utility- maximizing indifference curve (U.) and choice of leisure hours (L). [Note: When incorporating the 10% wage subsidy into the graph in part b, I am not expecting perfect precision. Just try your best to draw the new income-leisure constraint as though a 10% wage subsidy has been added.]

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter16: Labor Markets

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 16.3P

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Consider the following labor-leisure choice model. U(C,L) = C^2/3L^1/3 C = wN + π – T H= N+ L Where C: consumptionL: leisureN: hours workedH = 50 : total hoursw = 4 : hourly wageπ = 20 : non-labor income T = 10 : lump-sum tax Suppose the hourly wage changes to w = 5. Perform a decomposition and fill in the table C L N Substitution Effect Income Effect Total Effect
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One proposal for reforming the welfare system is to create a negative income tax. Under the negative income tax, each person is entitled to a grant of G dollars permonth. For every dollar the person earns, the grant is reduced by t dollars. a. Suppose G = 200 and t = 0.40. Consider an individual whose hourly wage = $10. There are 30 days in a month, so the total allotment of T = 720. Sketch the budgetconstraint before and after the introduction of the negative income tax. b. Would people work more or less with the implementation of this system? c. What if t = 100%? Explain!
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