Firm 1 Silence Disclosure Silence -200, -200 0,-590 Firm 2 Disclosure -590, 0 -450, 450 fine (a hundred million won) 1. Where is the Nash Equilibrium? - find out the dominant strategy O a. (Silence, Silence) = (-200, -200) O b. (Silence, Disclosure) = (-590, 0) c. (Disclosure, Silence) = (0, -590) d. (Disclosure, Disclosure) = (-450, -450)

Firm 1 Silence Disclosure Silence -200, -200 0,-590 Firm 2 Disclosure -590, 0 -450, 450 fine (a hundred million won) 1. Where is the Nash Equilibrium? - find out the dominant strategy O a. (Silence, Silence) = (-200, -200) O b. (Silence, Disclosure) = (-590, 0) c. (Disclosure, Silence) = (0, -590) d. (Disclosure, Disclosure) = (-450, -450)

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.6P

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