firm has a production function Y=150N^0.6. The real wage is W=30. The production process of this firm causes pollution. The government passes a law that requires the firm to stop polluting. This firm discovers that it can prevent pollution by hiring 0.2 additional workers for each worker in the production process to clean up. Let N denote the amount of labor hired on the production line. If the firm wants to maximize its profit, what should be the value of N?

firm has a production function Y=150N^0.6. The real wage is W=30. The production process of this firm causes pollution. The government passes a law that requires the firm to stop polluting. This firm discovers that it can prevent pollution by hiring 0.2 additional workers for each worker in the production process to clean up. Let N denote the amount of labor hired on the production line. If the firm wants to maximize its profit, what should be the value of N?

Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)

14th Edition

ISBN:9781305506381

Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Publisher:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Chapter7: Production Economics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 4E

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