Ten workers work jointly on a project. All 10 workers are equally skilled. The total value of the output produced is $100 times the sum of the number of hours worked by all 10 workers. Each worker's utility is equal to his income minus the square of the number of hours he works. Each worker is selfish. The employers have no way of keeping track of any individual's work effort, so they decide to let each person work as long as he wants to and they divide the total value of the output equally among the workers. How much income will each worker get?

Ten workers work jointly on a project. All 10 workers are equally skilled. The total value of the output produced is $100 times the sum of the number of hours worked by all 10 workers. Each worker's utility is equal to his income minus the square of the number of hours he works. Each worker is selfish. The employers have no way of keeping track of any individual's work effort, so they decide to let each person work as long as he wants to and they divide the total value of the output equally among the workers. How much income will each worker get?

Survey Of Economics

10th Edition

ISBN:9781337111522

Author:Tucker, Irvin B.

Publisher:Tucker, Irvin B.

Chapter10: Labor Markets And Income Distribution

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 14SQ

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