Here is a Bayesian BOS game. Man has a special preference t1 on boxing while woman has a special preference t2 on opera. Both are in [0,2]. The preference information is private. i.e. Each knows his (her) own preference but does not know the other's preference. The below is the payoff. M/W Boxing Opera We are checking whether the below strategy profile is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. "Man chooses boxing if t1>p while woman chooses opera if t2>q." 1) Given t1, man will choose boxing if t1> /q- Boxing 3+11,1 0,0 Opera 0,0 1,3+12
Here is a Bayesian BOS game. Man has a special preference t1 on boxing while woman has a special preference t2 on opera. Both are in [0,2]. The preference information is private. i.e. Each knows his (her) own preference but does not know the other's preference. The below is the payoff. M/W Boxing Opera We are checking whether the below strategy profile is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. "Man chooses boxing if t1>p while woman chooses opera if t2>q." 1) Given t1, man will choose boxing if t1> /q- Boxing 3+11,1 0,0 Opera 0,0 1,3+12
Chapter8: Game Theory
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 8.7P
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![Here is a Bayesian BOS game. Man has a special preference t1 on boxing while woman has a special preference t2 on opera. Both are in [0,2]. The preference information is
private. i.e. Each knows his (her) own preference but does not know the other's preference.
The below is the payoff.
M/W
Boxing
Opera
Воxing
3+t1,1
0,0
Opera
0,0
1,3+t2
We are checking whether the below strategy profile is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
"Man chooses boxing if t1>p while woman chooses opera if t2>g."
1) Given t1, man will choose boxing if t1>
/g-
2) Given t2, woman will choose opera if t2>
/p-
4) By shoving the simultaneous equations, we get p=q=sqrt(6)-](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2F59e4c767-a288-4506-a863-68569714fe8d%2F82fd6bae-b28d-4ae5-8dac-2590ff7621a7%2F9d3hd6hf_processed.png&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:Here is a Bayesian BOS game. Man has a special preference t1 on boxing while woman has a special preference t2 on opera. Both are in [0,2]. The preference information is
private. i.e. Each knows his (her) own preference but does not know the other's preference.
The below is the payoff.
M/W
Boxing
Opera
Воxing
3+t1,1
0,0
Opera
0,0
1,3+t2
We are checking whether the below strategy profile is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
"Man chooses boxing if t1>p while woman chooses opera if t2>g."
1) Given t1, man will choose boxing if t1>
/g-
2) Given t2, woman will choose opera if t2>
/p-
4) By shoving the simultaneous equations, we get p=q=sqrt(6)-
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