I do not need the graph, just help with the explanation. Thank you:) A tax on healthy people. Consider the basic Rothschild-Stiglitz model with asymmetric information and robust and frail customers. Suppose the government imposes a Wellness Tax τ > 0, on robust and frail types but collects on this tax only when they are healthy (that is, there is no tax if they turn out to be sick). Will a separating equilibrium still be possible? Draw a version of the Rothschild-Stiglitz diagram to support your answer.

I do not need the graph, just help with the explanation. Thank you:) A tax on healthy people. Consider the basic Rothschild-Stiglitz model with asymmetric information and robust and frail customers. Suppose the government imposes a Wellness Tax τ > 0, on robust and frail types but collects on this tax only when they are healthy (that is, there is no tax if they turn out to be sick). Will a separating equilibrium still be possible? Draw a version of the Rothschild-Stiglitz diagram to support your answer.

EBK HEALTH ECONOMICS AND POLICY

7th Edition

ISBN:9781337668279

Author:Henderson

Publisher:Henderson

Chapter5: Demand For Health And Medical Care

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 3QAP

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Suppose the government imposes a Wellness Tax τ > 0, on robust and frail types but collects on this tax only when they are healthy (that is, there is no tax if they turn out to be sick). Will a separating equilibrium still be possible? Draw a version of the Rothschild-Stiglitz diagram to support your answer
5. A tax on healthy people. Consider the basic Rothschild-Stiglitz model with asymmetric information and robust and frail customers. a. Suppose the government imposes a Wellness Tax τ > 0, on robust and frail types but collects on this tax only when they are healthy (that is, there is no tax if they turn out to be sick). Will a separating equilibrium still be possible? Draw a version of the Rothschild-Stiglitz diagram to support your answer. b. Will a separating equilibrium be possible if the tax τ > 0, is imposed on all customers in both sick and healthy states? Again, support your answer graphically.
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One major premise of the Rothschild–Stiglitz model is that there is a perfectly competitive market for health insurance. Suppose instead that the market is not perfectly competitive, and in fact competitor firms have a hard time entering the market. Could a pooling equilibrium occur in this case? What is it about competition that prevents pooling in the Rothschild–Stiglitz model? No formal proof is necessary, but do make your reasoning clear. Evaluate the following statement: competition in health insurance markets is harmful.
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One major premise of the Rothschild-Stiglitz (RS) model is that there is a perfectly competitive market for health insurance. Suppose instead that the market is not perfectly competitive, and in fact competitor ﬁrms have a hard time entering the market. Could a pooling equilibrium occur in this case? What is it about competition that prevents pooling in the RS model? No formal proof is necessary, but do make your reasoning clear. Evaluate the following statement: competition in health insurance markets is harmful.
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