In the basic model of insurance, income is the only input into a person’s utility. This is obviously not realistic. If we relax our assumption that utility is determined only by income levels, can any insurance contract provide full protection against the possibility of becoming severely ill? Give examples of risks associated with becoming sick that are not typically covered by formal health insurance. Can you think of ways that people informally insure against these “uninsurable” risks?

In the basic model of insurance, income is the only input into a person’s utility. This is obviously not realistic. If we relax our assumption that utility is determined only by income levels, can any insurance contract provide full protection against the possibility of becoming severely ill? Give examples of risks associated with becoming sick that are not typically covered by formal health insurance. Can you think of ways that people informally insure against these “uninsurable” risks?

EBK HEALTH ECONOMICS AND POLICY

7th Edition

ISBN:9781337668279

Author:Henderson

Publisher:Henderson

Chapter5: Demand For Health And Medical Care

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 3QAP

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The Akerlof model can be used to model the health insurance market. In this market, which party is analogous to car buyers? Which party is analogous to car sellers?What would it mean for the health insurance market to unravel?
The fact that most medical care purchases are financed through insurance: a. has no effect on health care consumption because aggregate costs are the same regardless of payment method. b. reduces the amount of health care consumed by raising the price of additional units of care. c.has decreased health care costs and therefore reduced aggregate health care expenditures. d. increases the amount of health care consumed by reducing the price of additional units of care.
Suppose, if ill, that Fred’s demand for health services is summarized by the demand curve Q = 50 − 2P , where P is the price of services. How many services does he buy at a price of $20? Suppose that Fred’s probability of illness is 0.25. What is the actuarially fair price of health insurance for Fred with a zero coinsurance rate? If the insurance company pays Fred’s entire loss, will the insurance company offer him insurance at the actuarially fair rate? Why? Note:- Do not provide handwritten solution. Maintain accuracy and quality in your answer. Take care of plagiarism. Answer completely. You will get up vote for sure.
In what sense is the individual considered a “producer” of health in the Grossman model?
The Grossman model envisions consumers deciding between investments in health H and investments in home goods Z. Figure below depicts a typical consumer’s production possibility frontier for health and home goods.a. Succinctly describe why the graph is shaped the way it is between points A and B.b. Succinctly describe why the graph is shaped the way it is between points B and C.c. Would any consumer with typical preferences ever pick a point on the graph between A and B? Explain succinctly why or why not.
Julia is a 28- year-old nonsmoking , non-drinking female of normal weight Because of adverse selection in health insurance , (A) She will be charged less for her premiums than people who are higher risks ) B)She is less likely to buy health insurance than the average person, because policy premiums are based on expected medical expenditures of people who are less healthy than she is ( C) When she get health insurance , she will be less likely to take care of herself. ) D)She must get health insurance early in life, and is likely to lose health insurance if she smokes , drinks to excess, or gains weight. E) She is more likely than the average person to buy health insurance , because she is more likely to be offered it.
Suppose your preferences can characterized by the simple utility function U = √C, where C is consumption. You enjoy rock climbing, where you have a 10% chance of get- ting injured and losing $50,000. Your income (and therefore consumption) in the uninjured state is $90,000. What is the most you are willing to pay for an insurance policy? What is the fee for a fair insurance?
The Grossman model envisions consumers deciding between investments in health H and investments in home goods Z. Figure below depicts a typical consumer’s production possibility frontier for health and home goods. a. Would any consumer with typical preferences ever pick a point on the graph between A and B? Explain succinctly (using Figure attached) why or why not. b. Succinctly describe why the graph is shaped the way it is between pointsA and B.c. Succinctly describe why the graph is shaped the way it is between points B and C.
One curious finding from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment was that the rate of treated bone fractures per capita was higher in the group of families that had been assigned to the free insurance plan, compared with those in the high copayment plans. Concisely describe how the Grossman model might explain the fact that people facing higher prices for health care would break bones less often. Be sure to discuss the concept of marginal efficiency of health investment.
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While the Lindahl model (equilibrium) can be analogous to the market for private goods, they have interesting differences. How do we interpret Q1 in the diagram? What about S?
The following is an excerpt from "The Labor Market Effects of Rising Health Insurance Premiums," by Katherine Baicker, Amitabh Chandra. If workers in a certain sector of the economy or those who are married are systematically more likely to have different levels of unobservable characteristics that affect health insurance premiums, then such a correlation is possible. This problem is identical to the standard endogeneity problem in program evaluation, where receipt of the treatment is correlated with unobservable characteristics of the person receiving treatment. A solution to this problem is to instrument for imputed premiums using variables that are uncorrelated with εi and mi but are correlated with imputed health insurance premiums. In our analysis we use state‐level, per‐capita medical malpractice payments as an instrument for imputed premiums. In other words, in order for malpractice payments to be a valid instrument for health insurance premiums, it must be the case that…