If once vaccinated, a person cannot catch a cold or give a cold to someone else, the marginal social benefit resulting from consumption of the vaccine: O equals the marginal benefit received by consumers of the vaccine in a competitive equilibrium. O equals the marginal social cost of producing the vaccine in a competitive equilibrium. O is less than the marginal benefit received by consumers of the vaccine. exceeds the marginal benefit received by consumers of the vaccine.

If once vaccinated, a person cannot catch a cold or give a cold to someone else, the marginal social benefit resulting from consumption of the vaccine: O equals the marginal benefit received by consumers of the vaccine in a competitive equilibrium. O equals the marginal social cost of producing the vaccine in a competitive equilibrium. O is less than the marginal benefit received by consumers of the vaccine. exceeds the marginal benefit received by consumers of the vaccine.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter19: Externalities And Public Goods

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 19.6P

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